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Problem area 
Today's population movements are usually large and speedy (Mertus 1998: 332). 
Anthropologist Ajun Appadurai writes about the flow of people between nation-states as a 
result of globalization. This ‘ethnoscape’ as he calls the flow, includes tourists, immigrants, 
refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals. All these groups are 
believed to constitute an essential feature of the world and to affect the politics of nations. 
(Appadurai 1996: 33, 49)  
Naturally people move for different reasons, some in the pursue of job opportunities as with 
the case of many migrant workers others more dramatically due to natural disasters, eruption 
of conflict or other catastrophic events which rapidly make people flee their homes, and leave 
them in need of protection and assistance.  Every day an average of 23,000 persons leave their 
homes and seek protection elsewhere, either within the borders of their countries or in other 
countries. (UNHCR 2013: 2) Though there is in practice not a clear distinction between 
migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP’s), the theoretical distinction 
between the categories of displaced persons are difficult to apply in practice, and it is difficult 
to distinguish between different types of migration and causes of displacement (Loescher 
1993: 141).   
The international system of sovereign states is not designed for the mass movements of 
people and fluidity of belonging. Membership of states is bounded, and to according Professor 
in education Michalinos Zembylas, who build on the ideas of sociologist Georgio Agamben, it 
means that some belong to the state and naturally are granted citizens’ rights, while others 
don’t belong and therefore do not have such rights. (Zembylas 2010: 38) It is states who 
endorse international human rights conventions and an individual's rights are therefore 
strongly connected to the state to which he/she belongs. Consequently it is crucial for 
individuals to hold membership of a state and that this state respects the human rights. (Cmiel 
2004: 117 – 135; Sørensen 2006: 125) 
This global system of nation-states causes problems for stateless persons, and people who 
belong to a bad governed or failed state. (Sørensen 2006: 125; Zembylas 2010: 38) When 
people flee because of lack of protection from their states, then a serious failure of the state 
system has occurred. In the international political system based on sovereign states, people 
are supposed to be under protection within the boundaries of their states, and thus, any large 
uncontrolled movement of people beyond their borders causes problems to this political 
system.  (Keely 1996: 1057) 
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Despite the fact ‘ethnoscapes’ is a global phenomena, some 80 percent of the world’s refugees 
are now located in the global south. (UNHCR 2013: 2) The majority of the world’s refugees 
flee to poor neighbouring countries already suffering from economic underdevelopment, 
unemployment and shortage of land and other resources, unstable political systems, and 
ethnic and social cleavages. Since large-scale refugee influxes can have a high impact on local 
economies and societies and endanger social and economic stability and security, 
governments in these affected low-income host states are often hesitant to offer asylum and 
allowing refugees to remain. (Stein 1986: 265; Loescher 1993: 24; Loescher 2003: 33) It is 
however not only governments in these poor host states who adopt restrictive asylum 
policies, also richer western states are increasingly restrictive toward refugees. (Betts et al. 
2012: 147; Harrall-Bond 1989: 43-44)  
Refugees are outside their country of nationality and are unable to return owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution or serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or 
freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.  
In theory refugees are supposed to be protected by international protocols as soon as they 
cross national frontiers to seek refuge in another country. It is recognized in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that every individual has the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
when in danger, and the principal of non-refoulement protects asylum seekers from being 
sent back home against their will, at least until their cases are examined (Loescher 1993: 139, 
143) However, while refugees have a right to seek asylum, states do not necessarily have an 
obligation to grant it. In drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, governments rejected a 
provision that would have guaranteed a right to asylum. (Ibid: 139) As Professor in 
International Law B.S Chimni states; global cooperation around refugee issues has become 
more difficult and complex because it is unrealistic to expect poor undeveloped countries to 
be generous to refugees if the rich states refuse to share the burden. (Chimni 1999: 12)  
In order to assist great numbers of refugees when they are arriving to new countries, they are 
often directed to large camps where humanitarian agencies are trying to fulfil their right to 
basic needs. UNHCR is believed to constitute a safety net that ensures that people can cross an 
international border to access those fundamental human rights, which not all states are 
willing or capable of living up to. (Betts et al 2012: 148) However, addressing the needs of the 
uprooted entails the protection and promotion of rights and the greater the host state’s 
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involvement with uprooted persons, the more rights potentially become available. (Mertus 
1998: 335) UNHCR thereby faces the fundamental challenge of persuading states to meet 
their obligations towards refugees in spite of their reluctance to provide asylum or to share 
the burden of refugee protection in other ways. (Betts et al. 2012: 3)  
Yet, there are a great number of forces both below and above the State, such as NGOs, with 
local and transnational consciousness, and transnational corporations, inter-governmental 
organizations, and regional collective arrangements which have an interest in issues related 
to humanitarian concerns, who participate in international, regional and national problem 
solving. (Mertus 1998: 333-334; Iriy 2002: 1 – 211; Dykman 2013: 1 – 35) In many cases 
UNHCR and implementing partners becomes the ones assisting the refugees in the field, when 
great numbers of refugees keep arriving into a certain country. In many cases large camps 
becomes the immediate response to such crisis, since there is no time for thinking or planning 
of ‘durable solutions’.  (NRC 2008: 22) Despite the chance to provide refugees with assistance 
and protection in those camps, UNHCR suffer to a serious lack of funding, whereas the 
humanitarian conditions in large refugee camps often becomes highly critical. (Harrell-Bond 
2002: 56; Jaji 2011: 231; Jacobsen 2001: 7; Newman 2003: 6 – 7; Malkki 2005: 114 – 117; 
Black 1998:2; Ellis 1996: 112 – 115) Taking into consideration that refugees often flee from 
protracted conflicts, they are likely to stay in the camps for years and bearing in mind the 
refugees right to work, to education and a standard living enshrined in the articles 23, 25 and 
26 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Humanitarian Rights (Web 10: UNHCR) and 
their rights in terms of food, hygienic and medical matters stated in the articles 85, 89 and 91 
of the Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention 1949: 196 – 199), placing refugees in camps is 
not a solution that lives up to international human or refugee rights.   
All of this lead us to pose the following research question:  
 
Research question: 
What are the barriers to and opportunities of finding durable solutions to mass influxes of 
refugees in the current international political system? 
 
Clarification of research question 
When referring to the current international political system we mean the present system of 
state and non-state actors who can influence refugee policy and management.  
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Durable solutions refers in this paper to UNHCRs definition of durable solutions including 
voluntary repatriation; local integration; or resettlement to a third country in situations 
where it is impossible for a person to go back home or remain in the host country. (Web 12: 
UNHCR) 
When writing mass influxes we refer to an amount of refugees that can have an economic and 
social effect on the host area, and is too large to fit inn to the existing structures of the area.  
When writing refugees we refer to the definition of UNHCR were “A refugee is someone who 
has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee 
has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership in a particular social group” (Web 11: UNHCR)  
Research design 
The study is structured as follows: We start by introducing the characteristics and critiques of 
refugee camps. There next we discuss the role of UNHCR in a neo-realistic/skeptic vs. 
liberalistic/globalist perspective. Then we turn to a theoretical discussion of the opportunities 
and barriers of the three durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local 
integration, and end by summing-up on the theoretical finding. In the second part of the paper 
we contextualize our findings with the case of the Daadab camps in East Kenya.  
Clarification of concepts 
 
Asylum means protection and can be granted by a state to a refugee, if the person fits the 
requirements of the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Asylum 
comprise certain specific manifestations of state conduct: (i) to admit a person to its 
territory;(ii) to allow the person to stay there; (iii) to refrain from expelling the person; (iv) to 
refrain from extraditing the person; and (v) to refrain from prosecuting, punishing, or 
otherwise restricting the person's liberty. (Boed 1994: 3) An individual do not have a right to 
be granted asylum, but states have the right to grant it if they wish so. In EU, it is only possible 
to apply for asylum in one country. (Web 15: EU; Boed 1994: 5-4) 
 
Non-refoulement is the cornerstone of international refugee law, which is a part of 
customary international law and thus legally binding on all states. Non-refoulement indicates 
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that refugees with a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion in their home 
country cannot be forced to return home to the country where their life or freedom would be 
threatened. (NRC 2008: 23, 241-242) 
International protection can be defined as “all actions aimed at ensuring the equal access and 
enjoyment of the rights of women, men, girls and boys of concern to UNHCR, in accordance with 
the relevant bodies of law (including international humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
law)”. (UNHCR 2011a) It includes interventions by states or UNHCR on behalf of asylum-
seekers and refugees to ensure that their rights, security, and welfare are recognized and 
safeguarded in accordance with international standards. Such interventions include: ensuring 
respect for the principle of non-refoulement; admission to safety; access to fair procedures for 
the determination of refugee status; humane standards of treatment; and the implementation 
of durable solutions. UNHCR is the only United Nations agency with a mandate for the 
protection of refugees at the global level. 
For a definition to refugee camps please look under the chapter of “characteristics of camps” 
Methodology 
Presentation of theory 
In order to include diverse views upon the issues regarding refugee management we use 
scholars with different academic backgrounds including international law, economy, political 
science, social science, international development studies and anthropology. Furthermore we 
have used scholars of various nationalities whose empirical research derives from different 
geographic settings. Also the research is based on both realist, liberalist, and constructivist 
approaches to global issues.    
Background on the prominent scholars in this paper can be found in the following:  
Anna Lindley has a doctorate from Oxford University in International Development and has 
been working as a researcher for the Refugee Studies Centre and the Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society at Oxford University. Her papers is based on research in Kenya.  
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Barbara Harrell-Bond is the founder of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford University, the 
world's first institution for the study of refugees. Her latest research conducted was on the 
extent to which refugees enjoy their rights in exile in Kenya and Uganda. 
Barry N. Stein, a professor of Political Science at Michigan State University with focus on 
refugees and displaced persons.  
B. S. Chimni, a professor of law with expertise in international law, international trade 
law and International refugee law.  Chimni is currently chairperson of the Centre for 
International Legal Studies (CILS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. 
Charles B. Keely, a Professor of International Migration at Georgetown University, United 
States 
Eric Werker, an American Professor in Business, Government, and the International 
Economy Unit at Harvard Business School. His research explores the political economy, 
macroeconomics, and business environments of emerging and frontier economies, 
particularly in Africa. 
Gaim Kibreab is expert on forced migration, resettlement, repatriation and development and 
Associate Professor in the Department of Economic History at Uppsala University in Sweden 
and Senior Research Fellow at the Oriental and African studies at the University of London. 
Gil Loescher is an 
expert on refugee policy and global politics. He is currently Visiting Professor at the Refugee S
tudies Centre in the Department of International Development, University of Oxford. 
Jeff Crisp is Head of Policy Development and Evaluation at UNHCR's headquarters in Geneva. 
He has also held senior positions with the Global Commission on International Migration, the 
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian issues and the British Refugee 
Council. He has a Masters Degree and PhD from the Centre of West African Studies at the 
University of Birmingham, UK. 
Julie Mertus, a professor in International Service at Cornwell University and co-director of 
Ethics, Peace and Global Affairs and has written widely on human rights and gender, conflict 
and the Balkans. 
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Liisa H. Malkki, an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University. Her research 
interests include: the politics of nationalism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and human 
rights discourses as transnational cultural forms. Her field research in Tanzania explored the 
ways in which political violence and exile may produce transformations of historical 
consciousness and national identity among displaced people. 
Michalinos Zembylas, a Assistent Professor of Education at the Open University of Cyprus 
and Director of Curriculum Development for CARDET. His paper used in this study is based on 
the ideas of Georgio Agambem, an Italian philosopher who is best known for his work 
investigating the concepts of the state of exception, form-of-life and homo sacer. 
Ninna Nyberg Sørensen has a PhD in social anthropology and is currently working as senior 
researcher at DIIS in Copenhagen, Denmark at the area of Global Regulation. Her former 
works have been focused on international migration, development and conflict and 
transnational processes in Latin America, Morocco and Somaliland.  
 
Why definition of camps? 
Within the next chapters we will try to come up with a definition to ‘camps’ in order to set a 
limit for our discussion towards alternatives to camps. Our definition is based on the 
understanding of different scholars, but it should be noted that the academic debate host 
many different understandings of ‘camps’ and that our definition therefore does not rely on a 
universal definition of camps. Furthermore we wish to use Dadaab camp in Kenya as an 
example to our discussion, and as a way to contextualize our findings. Therefore we try to 
make a definition which fits towards the characteristics of Dadaab camp. In our definition of 
camps we use research from Dadaab, but supplement with scholars who use examples from 
other countries in Africa, as well as South East Asia and the Balkans.   
 
Why Kenya and Dadaab as case? 
The background for using Dadaab camp as case partly lies within the political fight between 
Kenya and Somalia about the right to the Northern Frontier District where Dadaab camp is 
located. Despite the fact that the area today is under the state of Kenya, host and refugee 
communities overlap closely and their identities are intertwined, (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 23) 
which makes the presence of more than half a million refugees (the majority being Somalis) in 
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Dadaab highly interesting. (UNHCR 2013: 34)  Furthermore the country of Somalia has been 
suffering to a severe state failure, which has caused mass influxes of Somali refugees into 
Kenya. The Kenyan governments (As well as many Western governments) are hostile towards 
Somali refugees, (UNHCR 2005c: 11) but yet the fairly unproblematic relation between 
refugees in Dadaab and the local population makes it an interesting case.  
UNHCR and refugees 
UNHCR  
While refugees have been present throughout history, UNHCR and the global refugee regime 
were only established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to help displaced 
Europeans. Precisely it was established in December 1950 by the United Nations General 
Assembly with a three-year mandate to complete its work. However, the following year the 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the legal foundation of helping 
refugees and the basic statute guiding UNHCR's work, was adopted. UNHCR has since 
continually expanded both its core mandate concerns and the scope of its work. (Web 6: 
UNHCR; Betts et al. 2012: 21-28) 
By 1956 UNHCR was facing the outpouring of refugees when Soviet forces crushed the 
Hungarian Revolution, and in the 1960’s and 1970’s UNHCR became increasingly involved in 
refugee situations in the third World. The decolonization of Africa produced the first of that 
continent's numerous refugee crises needing UNHCR intervention. Over the following two 
decades, UNHCR had to help with displacement crises in Asia and Latin America. In the 1980 
it also took on a greater role in providing assistance in refugee camps and shifting away from 
its traditional focus on legal protection. In the late 1990s new waves of refugees in Europe 
came from the series of wars in the Balkans and continued refugee problems were 
experienced in Africa and Asia. UNHCR at that time also took on ever greater responsibility for 
the protection of internally displaced persons IDPs) and also stateless people, irregular 
migrants, urban refugees and victims of natural disasters. There has since the 50’s been a 
changing in the nature of displacement, whereas UNHCR has needed to reinterpret is 
mandate. (Web 6: UNHCR; Betts et al. 2012: 3-10, 28, 151) 
Over the last 60 years, the political context and environment of UNHCR’s work has changed 
significantly. Although the office was created explicitly as “non-political” actor, it was been 
shaped by changing political context and the response of states to asylum and burden sharing. 
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(Betts et al.2012: 149) UNHCR has had to use its moral authority, diplomatic and capacity 
building skills to persuade states to recognize and fulfil their core legal obligations. UNHCR 
has had to appeal to the interest of a broad range of actors, especially states, and channel 
these interests into a commitment to refugee protection. The institutional context has 
changed as well with the globalization. New institutions in areas of labour migration, 
international travel, human rights and peacebuilding, both within and outside of UN regime 
have emerged. (Ibid: 151) 
UNHCR is now mandated by the United Nations to lead and coordinate international action for 
the world-wide protection of refugees and the resolution of refugee problems. UNHCR’s 
primary purpose is to safeguard the right and well-being of refugee. International refugee law 
provides an essential framework of principles for UNHCR’s humanitarian activities and they 
are guided by the 1951 United Nations Convention relating the Status of Refugees and its1967 
Protocol. UNHCR strives to protect refugees and promote solutions to their problems, and 
ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another 
state. UNHCR works in partnership with governments, regional organizations, international 
and non-governmental organization. (UNHCR 2007: XI)  
 
Camps 
States are responsible for providing protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees 
within their territories, including those living in camps. In situations where the authorities are 
unwilling or unable to provide protection to the displaced population, humanitarian actors 
have a duty to support the State to do so. To provide protection and assistance to displaced 
populations, and ensure that refugees are treated in accordance with standards of 
international human rights, refugee- and humanitarian law, establishment of refugees camps 
are sometimes the only choice for humanitarian agencies. Camps cannot provide permanent 
or sustainable solutions, but they can provide a temporary refuge where vital and often life-
saving assistance can be offered. Camps offer refugees physical and material security, as well 
as legal security, such as access to justice, a legal status and documentation, together with 
medical treatment, food, and shelter while waiting for more durable solutions. (NRC 2008: 22-
24, 238-239) 
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Characteristics of camps  
Various forms of refugee camps exist, however, in the wider literature, ‘camps’ are rarely 
conceptually defined even though a number of characteristics underlie the usage of the term. 
(Harrell Bond 2002: 56) We have sought to collect several characteristics of camps used by 
different scholars. In the following we will list these factors to narrow down the 
understanding of the term ‘camp’ in this paper. The characteristics of camps are also 
important to understand the critique of refugee camps which follow this section. 
Factors defining camps: 
- Designed as temporary stations where refugees only are meant to reside until they 
can return to their home country. Camps are administered by UNHCR and the host 
government, while NGOs provide refugees with relief and assistance. Camps are 
however always meant as a “last resort,” when all other options are exhausted (Jaji 
2011: 225; NRC 2008: 2; Jacobsen 2001: 6)  
- A high density of population leading to a limited, overcrowded restricted area within 
the whole compass of daily life is to be conducted. A high number of people in the 
camps also make it necessary to share facilities and entail a lack of privacy. (Harrell-
Bond 2000: 6; Black 1998:2; Ellis 1996: 112 – 115) 
- Lack of rights and freedom of movement gives a special and limited status to those 
inhabiting the camp. A replacement takes place of citizens’ rights with a regime of 
refugees’ rights, which requires refugees to be apolitical. The legal rights of refugees, 
including human rights, are often not fulfilled even though people have obtained status 
of refugees. Violations of international refugee and human rights law occur on a vast 
scale. (Newman 2003: 6 – 7; Jacobsen 2001: 1-2; Jaji 2011: 225, 229; Malkki 2005: 114 
– 117) 
- Dependency on aid is common in camps, because of legal restrictions on engaging in 
subsistence farming or other economic activities. Humanitarian agencies who manage 
the camps distribute food instead. In camps there are often a low degree of income-
generating programmes which makes it difficult for refugees to become self-reliant. 
(Harrell-Bond 2002: 56; Harrell-Bond 1997: 7; Jaji 2011: 231; Jacobsen 2001: 7)  
- Registration is an important feature of camp life. Refugees are officially registered by 
the humanitarian agencies and receive official assistance if they obtain refugee status. 
The camp administration take newcomers through a screening and registration 
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process which in principle separates citizens from refugees and economic migrants 
from those fleeing from persecution. (Jaji 2011: 227) Refugees in camps are waiting for 
a solution to their situation and have neither been granted asylum or been allowed to 
resettle.  
- A strong hierarchy is pronounced in camps. There exist a strong hierarchy and social 
distance between camp administration and aid agencies on the one hand, and refugees 
on the other. (Hyndman 1997: 17; Harrell-Bond 2002: 56) In relation to the mode of 
governance in camps Jaji writes: “Traditional and intermediary hierarchies of authority 
are replaced by camp bureaucratic authority and the discourse of equality among 
refugees. The particularities of refugees’ nationality, ethnicity and religion are ‘put in 
brackets’. (Jaji 2011: 229) 
Even though these are common features of camps it is important to keep in mind the fluidity 
of refugee settlement.  Not all refugees live in camps, and though the refugees do not enjoy the 
right of free movement within the host country, refugees may frequently move between 
different types of settlement. Refugees leave the camps to find work, to trade, to visit the city 
or to move there, and might return to the camps during the hungry season, or when there are 
security threats outside. (Jacobsen 2001: 8) De Montclos also writes about how refugee camps 
often exist for decades and over time transform into cities in view of their population and 
demographic density. 
 
In the following section we will dig deeper into the critique of refugee camps, and thereafter 
turn to a discussion of the politics around the encampment of refugees and the possibilities 
for especially UNHCR to find durable solutions to refugee protection.  
Critique of refugee camps 
The encampment of refugees is extremely criticized by several scholars and is referred to by 
many as ‘warehousing’ of refugees. In the following chapter we will look into some scholars’ 
critiques of refugee camps.  
 
Economic dependence 
Economic activity is usually not permitted in refugee camps, only some income-generating 
programs based in camp. The opportunity for refugees to become economically active is a 
matter both of government policy and the willingness of the local population to allow refugees 
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to participate in the economy. (Jacobsen 2001: 16, 11) Werker describes how the restrictions 
in refugee camps serve to distort the economy of refugees. Camps are often settled in remote 
areas and the physical isolation, in addition to restrictions on movement and on employment 
outside the camps, make up a barrier, which keeps the refugees from participating in external 
markets. Isolation causes higher costs of transportation and on gathering information about 
other prices on the market, new goods or alternative suppliers. With high transport costs the 
trade will tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few traders, creating situations that are 
ripe for discriminatory pricing, and effectively decrease the value of the refugees labour inside 
the settlement. The reduced access to outside markets may thereby affect the price refugees 
engaged in productive activities receive for their labour, and refugees who remain in the camp 
labour market can have a difficult time matching their skills to the labour demand. (Werker 
2007: 471, Black 1998: 2) 
The camps thus weaken the refugees’ terms of trade and hinder them in their efforts to 
maximize the profits from their production. (Werker 2007: 468) 
 
However, camp refugees are not expected to be self-reliant. NGOs, subcontracted by UNHCR, 
provide food distribution, and services such as schooling, health, water and sanitation. 
Jacobsen writes that in some cases, refugees use the camps as part of a broader household 
strategy of survival, where the workers of the family live in the local community where they 
can find income, and the dependents (elderly, mothers and children) live in the camp where 
they have access to assistance. (Jacobsen 2001:7-8) De Montclos argues that camps are 
seldom isolated, as new local and international networks expand between them and their 
surrounding areas. Supported by international and local humanitarian agencies, large camps 
emerge as urban districts and after a certain period of time become trading centers and 
labour markets. The trading networks of the camps may supply the surrounding areas 
because refugees sometimes out of shortages, are forced to sell a portion of the food 
distributed to them, in order to purchase the items that they lack. The market competition in 
and around the camps is intense, but many refugees manage to adapt to a market of less well-
off customers by selling goods in smaller quantities. (De Montclos 2000: 205-206, 214)  
However, the economic activities of that kind are highly fragile. Humanitarian aid is by its 
nature provisional. It cannot support indefinitely an economic dynamic which would create 
and develop a market town, and host countries 'encampment' policy towards refugees 
penalizes initiatives by refugees for investment and settlement. Lack of formal legal 
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recognition is a major constraint on refugee camps to become viable urban settlements with 
possibilities for inhabitants to become self-reliant. (De Montclos 2000: 219-220) 
 
The encampment risk making the refugees dependent on humanitarian assistance. That is a 
situation which becomes costly for the international donors and NGOs, who faces difficulties 
raising the funds and food for the growing number of relief programmes around the world. 
(Werker 2007: 468-469; Harrell-Bond 2000: 5; Hovil 2007: 608). Being dependent on hand-
outs for a long period of time undermines people roles as breadwinners and they are deprived 
of their authority which contributes to the loss of self-esteem, particularly that of men. 
Domestic violence often increases in refugee situations and both men and women may be 
suffering anxiety and depression as a consequence of the hopeless situation in which they are 
living. (Harrell-Bond 2000: 7) Thus, while the restrictions of camps may serve to “protect” the 
refugees, they also cut into refugee’s self-sufficiency, which is both expensive for the aid 
agencies and have psychological consequences for the refugees.   
 
Violence, recruitment and military attacks  
Camps are often established close to the border, which makes them situated usually in rural 
areas and often in conflict zones. (Jacobsen 2001: 7) Refugees can be warehoused in refugee 
camps for years, despairing of the future. The frustration makes some refugees turn to 
violence and become easy recruits for terrorist networks. Fighters often mingle among 
refugee populations and use the camps for recuperation and to recruit and mobilize for 
ongoing conflicts in their countries of origin. These refugee warriors often pursue 
independent foreign policies that prove difficult to contain and control, and the packed camps, 
protected by international law, can provide excellent cover for guerrillas and serve as bases 
from which they can launch attacks. (Loescher 1993: 27; Loescher 2003: 34-36; Crisp 2000: 
11) 
The perception of refugee camps as bases and sanctuaries for armed groups that are sources 
of insurgency, resistance, and terrorist movements clearly attract military retaliation. Refugee 
camps may therefore often be the target of direct military attacks. In pursuit of national 
security objectives, neighbouring states sometimes employ or even instigate military activity 
within refugee-populated areas across their borders, in the form of aerial bombing or by 
means of land-based attacks. (Crisp 2000: 10; Loescher 1993: 27)  The attacks seems to have 
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a number of related objectives: to prevent the camps from being used as a political and 
military base for armed forces, to drive the mass of exiled people back to their country of 
origin, or to gain regional hegemony. Also according to Lucy Hovil, and her critique towards 
refugee camps, there is a misleading political understanding that refugees are better off in 
camps for their own security, since there is growing evidence that camps are an easy target 
for bandits and rebel groups. (Hovil 2007: 603) 
Violence within the camps is also widespread because, in many instances, host countries do 
not have the capacity or willingness to maintain law and order in the remote and 
underdeveloped areas where the largest number of refugees are often to be found. 
Consequently, refugees in these areas are affected by variety of threats to their physical 
security and life in refugee camps has become increasingly dangerous (Crisp 2000: 10; 
Loescher 1993: 25). Refugee camps are frequently associated with problems such as crime, 
banditry, prostitution, alcoholism and a vast increase in the flows of arms and drugs. 
Furthermore studies suggest that other forms of violence such as coercion, intimidation, 
domestic and sexual violence, armed robbery, conscription into militia forces, and abductions 
for the purpose of forced marriage are often seen in camps and refugee settlements. Also 
fighting between different clans and sub-tribes within the same refugee community or armed 
confrontations between refugees of different nationalities are not unusual. (Crisp 2000: 8, 10; 
Loescher 1993: 25) 
The understanding of refugees as ‘dangerous’ makes up an argument for putting refugees into 
camps, because it might serve to better control them. It is often argued that since refugees are 
fleeing from areas of violent conflict they pose a potential security threat, which could disturb 
the security of the country, and are therefore to be observed in camps. (Hovil 2007: 604) 
Black counters this understanding by arguing that the rebellion among refugees is due to the 
way that they are encamped – not a natural characteristic of refugees. (Black 1988: 7)  
Poor health conditions  
Apart from being dangerous and depressive to live in, the camps are also criticized for being 
temporary structures. They are seldom planned for long duration or population growth, 
despite that it is uncertain when the refugees can go back to their country of origin. Some 
refugees stay in camps for decades. The camps are therefore often overcrowded with badly 
dwelling structures such as are tents or flimsy huts, and water and sanitation infrastructure is 
problematic, especially over the long term. (Jacobsen 2001: 7) Epidemics such as measles, 
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dysentery, meningitis and cholera are often widespread in the overcrowded camps, and 
epidemics of nutrition-related diseases are also common because the lack of vitamins in the 
rations supplied by international aid. (Harrell-Bond 2000:6) 
Involuntary repatriation  
The austere conditions in refugee camps can serve to discourage people from staying in them 
long and thus make refugees repatriate involuntary. This is a major concern because of the 
principal of non-refoulement, which entails that repatriation should be a free and informed 
choice, not pushed by badly conditions or insecurity in the country of asylum (Jacobsen 2001: 
7) ; NRC 2008: 211-213). However, one reason host governments and relief agencies prefer 
camps is that in addition to making the management of assistance easier, camps are seen as 
facilitating repatriation. (Jacobsen 2001: 7) Hovil counter the argument of refugees being 
more likely to repatriate if they live in camps. Her own findings from research in Uganda 
proves that the majority, whether in camp or not, expressed a longing to return home, and 
among those who had self-settled many, despite having been in Uganda for years, still had a 
hope for voluntary repatriation. (Hovil 2007: 615)  
Refugees in a globalized world 
To dig deeper into a discussion of the possible scope of the UNHCR’s actions reveals some 
interesting interpretations of why refugees are gathered in camps for long periods of time, 
and more durable solutions being difficult to find and implement.  
The matter of the opportunities of UNHCR (as an intergovernmental organization trying to 
promote international cooperation) political challenges and being efficient in the protection of 
refugees, can be approached with theories in the field of international relations, and thus 
discussed from a realistic vs. liberal perspective. When studying international organizations 
and cooperation the disagreements between the two approaches are similar to the antipodes 
in globalization theories: the skeptics and the globalists. In the following we therefore do not 
distinguish between a neo-realistic and skeptic approach, and in same way, between the 
viewpoints of liberal institutionalism and globalists.  
While intergovernmental organizations are heavily criticized by scholars in the realist 
tradition of research, the idea of an efficient international refugee regime is more promising 
from a liberal perspective.  One’s approach to international cooperation will be of central 
importance for the prospects of alternative solutions to refugee issues.   
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A neorealistic approach to the UNHCR 
A neorealistic and skeptical approach to the UNHCR is prevalent in the literature on refugee 
issues. It is believed that UNHCR as an intergovernmental organization faces severe 
constraints in protecting the interests and rights of refugees, because what should be an 
international response to refugee flows is located in the U.N. system, which is founded on the 
international structure of nation-states. It is argued that the international refugee regime 
thereby instead risk to become the protection of states and promotion of interests of 
governments. (Harrall-Bond 1989: 62)  
UNHCR is dependent on the states that fund it, and consequently cannot act as a neutral body 
with the freedom of action to represent single-mindedly the interests of refugees when these 
interests do not conform with those of the states supporting it. (Ibid: 45-46) The mandate of 
UNHCR to provide protection to refugees is a mandate given by states and thereby states 
define its scope of operation, and states provide authoritative interpretations of the meaning 
of its mandate under changing conditions. (Keely 1996: 1061) 
 
UNHCR’s ability to respond to the needs of refugees is greatly constrained by the fact that only 
states can grant asylum and the rights necessary to start life anew. When a state grants 
asylum, it is exercising its sovereignty and thereby the political will of the host states controls 
the gateway.  
Although generous international assistance and economic aid can ease the task of integration, 
States maintain a resolute grip over asylum decisions. (Mertus 1998: 336; Stein 1986: 267)  
UNHCR’s power over refugee policy is limited by being dependent upon the voluntary 
contributions of key donor governments, who have become increasingly frustrated over the 
growing cost of supporting the organization and have sought to reduce their obligations. Key 
states also carry out increasingly restrictive refugee policies, and issue permission to initiate 
operations on the territory of the host governments. (Harrall-Bond 1989: 44; Betts et al. 2012: 
4). 
 
The critique of UNHCR based on its dependence on states is rooted in the neorealist and 
skeptical attitude towards the claim that genuine cooperation and robust international 
agreements can exist in a system of sovereign states. To the extent that other actors have an 
impact on global politics, according to this perspective, it only occurs within a framework 
dominated by states that cooperate solely on the basis of their own self-interests, and this 
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automatically pursuit of national interests makes the intergovernmental institutions 
inefficient. (Jackson and Sørensen 2010: 115, 76; Held and Mcgrew 2002: 16)  
 
Another central argument in the neorealist tradition of research is that of national security as 
being the main interest of states. (Jackson and Sørensen 2010: 75) How ready a country is to 
respond to the needs of refugees, to offer them temporary asylum or permanent settlement 
therefore also depends on its sense of security. (Loescher 1993: 25) According to Zembylas, 
there has in recent years been a tendency to politically present refugees as being a threat to 
national security through what he calls “fear of the others”, while liberal and humanitarian 
discourses of citizenship paint a picture of refugees and migrants as souls in danger needing 
to be taking care of. In recent years, around the western world, there has been an increase in 
the installations of control and exclusion to keep refugees and immigrants outside national 
borders, including prevention of access to work, education, health care and housing. 
(Zembylas 2010: 31-32) The perceived security threat posed by refugees might be the main 
reason for these moves and for the preference of refugee settlement in camps. In the following 
dig deeper into the security concerns of host states in relation to refugee influx.  
 
Refugees as a threat to security and an economic and environmental burden         
The majority of the world’s refugees are hosted in the poor regions of the world. The influx of 
refugees in these poor regions can risk increasing the competition with already desperate 
nationals for scarce jobs and services, and putting a further strain on social services and 
physical infrastructure. When refugees arrive and compete for jobs, they drive the wages 
down and when they compete for scarce goods they create inflation. (Loescher 1993: 24; 
Loescher 2003: 33) The settlement of a high number of refugees in marginal areas also put 
further strain on the land and water resources of the host state where cultivable land may not 
be available even for their own people due to an arid or semi-arid climate. It may result in 
serious long-term environmental damage, and the host's own development efforts may be 
adversely affected. (Stein 1986: 265; Kibreab 1993: 326) Host governments may therefore be 
unwilling to give permanent asylum to refugees because the size of the refugee population 
simply is too large for the host to absorb, and there exits an unwillingness or inability to make 
a financial contribution from their own scarce resources. Often countries also experience 
large groups of internally displaced persons and other migrants that do not fall under the 
term ’refugee’ but who require the same attention and resources. (UNHCR 2006: 1) Support to 
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refugees may skew development plans and priorities, and governments fear being accused of 
giving priority to refugees rather than to needy nationals. Grievances among the local 
population have sometimes resulted in violence against refugees (Crisp 2000: 10). 
In addition to this comes that the presence of refugees also can exacerbate previously existing 
inter-communal tensions in the host country or shift the balance of power between 
communities, and thus promote social instability (Betts et al 2012: 147). Hesitance to allow 
settlement to refugees is therefore also caused by concerns that the refugees' ethnic, social, 
cultural, or political background might make them unacceptable to segments of the 
population and complicate local integration (Stein 1986: 274, Loescher 1993: 25). 
International relief efforts have earlier supported area-based assistance programmes that 
provided assistance to local populations as well as to refugees, but with shortfalls in donor 
funding UNHCR has had to cut back these programmes and focus more on refugees rather 
than on members of the local host population. It has served to increase local resentment of 
refugees and to exacerbate competition for the few resources available. (Loescher 2003: 33-
34) Also the state may fear that local settlement of refugees can encourage more refugees to 
flee to the country. (Stein 1986: 274) However, Stein points to the fact that the absorptive 
capacity of a country is highly dependent on national political interests (Ibid: 274). Kibreab 
argues that poor host countries might have political interests in keeping refugees in camps 
because it brings international aid in both food and finance to the country. Interests in 
keeping the aid pipeline open may make governments less enthusiastic in finding sustainable 
solutions to the problem of refugees and in allowing them to settle permanently and 
becoming self-reliant. (Kibreab 1993: 328) Yet, if economic benefits in relation to camps can 
serve as a valid reason for encampment of refugees, can be questioned, since local integration 
and work permit to refugees can prove to be a better investment. We will return to this point 
later in the paper.  
 
In addition to the strains which refugee influxes put on economic and environmental 
resources, refugees can also become a more direct threat to security. While refugees are often 
victims in conflictual relations between states they are by no means always passive political 
actors. Migrant and refugee communities frequently maintain close links with their countries 
of origin, and actively lobby their host governments to adopt specific foreign policies towards 
their former home countries. (Loescher 1993: 26-27) Sometimes refugees are even part of 
highly conscious communities with armed leaders engaged in warfare for political objectives, 
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such as to recapture their homeland, to destabilize the ruling regime, or to secure a separate 
state. (Loescher 1993: 27; Loescher 2003: 34-36) As described earlier in the section on 
refugee camps, this kind “refugee warriors” can attract military attacks from their home 
countries. The cross-border attacks and incursions, can easily lead to a deterioration of inter-
state relations, a widening pattern of armed conflict and additional population displacements. 
The presence of refugees therefore raises what may already be a high level of tension between 
neighboring countries, and thereby pose a threat to regional and international stability and 
security. (Loescher 1993: 26; Crisp 2000: 10) 
The threat of military attacks thus gives us another explanation of the host states’ 
unwillingness to allow the settlement of refugees. Evidently governments do not approve the 
use of their territories by military groups, allied to the refugees, for launching attacks on 
neighboring countries, and no government will be pleased with the dispersed settlement of 
refugees in a border area if it makes that area vulnerable to attack by parties to the conflict 
from which the refugees have fled. (Black 1998:2; 6; Loescher 2003: 34-36)  
Separation of humanitarian concerns and politics 
From a more constructivist perspective Zembylas criticizes the use of ‘fear’ as a legal 
argument when turning refugees down, denying their rights or placing them in camps. The 
perception of refugees being a threat to security Zembylas describes as ‘fearism’. The term is 
defined as: “a process and discourse hegemony [which] creates an experience of fear that is 
normalized [...] keeping the cultural matrix of ‘fear’ operative and relative invisible’ (Zembylas 
2010: 32, 34).  
He problematizes this ‘fearism’ and what he thinks is a general failure of questioning the 
separation of humanitarian concerns from security policy (called politics of fear) (Ibid: 36). 
The immediate policy question has become less one of what is best for the refugees and more 
one of what is in the interest of the security of both refugees and host populations. Issues such 
as accessibility, efficiency and transparency of aid delivery are likely to be rather less 
important than potential conflict between refugees and locals. (Mertus 1998: 328; Black 
1998:5)  
Zembylas states that the perception that refugees can threaten the well-being of a state or the 
character of a nation creates boundaries between ‘us and them’, and establishes a binary 
categorization between legitimate citizens and refugees. Granting that refugees are not 
citizens, many of their rights, such as right to work and receive education, are violated. 
(Zembylas 2010: 33-35) He states that once they are constructed as fearsome, they are 
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excluded from the field of human values, civic rights and moral obligations. They are 
constructed in ways as being so strange and dangerous to the nation that they could not be 
included without inflicting serious damage on everyone else. Violence against them thus 
becomes justified and normalized. By that logic, also encampment of refugees in remote areas 
becomes normalized and socially accepted despite the poor conditions in the camps. (Ibid: 39) 
He points to the neutrality of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the non-
political actions of the UNHCR and the refusal of these organizations to comment on the 
actions of political regimes as an example of failure to question the separation of 
humanitarian concerns and politics; to question ‘fearism’ and what Agamben calls ‘bio-power’. 
(Ibid: 36) Also Stein and Forsythe criticize the non-political humanitarian mandate of UNHCR, 
which risk contributing to the separation of humanitarian concerns and politics. While the 
mandate of UNHCR requires the agency to provide protection to refugees, it also indicates that 
it is to be a strictly non-political and a non-partisan organization. However, the two missions 
of the mandate risk to conflict. UNHCR is mandated to engage in the struggle for influence in 
behalf of persons of concern. It should lobby, exercise advocacy and try to advance preferred 
public policies for refugees. Trying to advance certain policies is a political act. UNHCR thus 
plays a political role in the sense of trying to influence public authorities to protect refugees, 
but is at the same time excluded from many disputes in relation to refugee issues because 
these are too political to allow the participation of UNHCR because of its non-political 
mandate. (Stein 1986: 272; Forsythe 2001: 1-2) 
 
From the study of the neorealistic perspective and the notion of fearism it can be concluded 
that because of the non-political character of UNHCR and its dependency on political 
willingness and donations from states that act according to national self-interests and security 
concerns, UNHCR face several constraints. The field is highly politicized and there is a 
tendency to separate security policies from humanitarian concerns, which makes the 
encampment of refugees logical and socially accepted.  
Before turning to a discussion of different alternatives to the encampment of refugees, we will 
look at the potentials of the international refugee regime from the more optimistic liberalistic 
and globalist perspective.  
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Liberal approach to UNHCR 
UNHCR is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and 
resolve refugee problems worldwide and safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. 
(Web 7: UNHCR) As described earlier refugees are indeed a global issue, which ask for global 
solutions, and the international community’s obligations to share the burden of refugees and 
to avoid the refoulement of people are ratified in the conventions in the area of refugee-
protection (Ibid)1. From a Globalist/liberal-institutionalist perspective, UNHCR promote 
cooperation between states by providing a forum for negotiations and a flow of information 
between their member states and thereby states cannot just act according to their national 
self-interests. (Jackson and Sørensen 2010: 106-108) Thus, UNHCR can serve as a tool to 
enable the burden-sharing and promote the states willingness to meet their ethical 
obligations to assist all individuals in need of protection.  
 
Globalists would also argue that globalization has resulted in greater willingness of 
international actors to interfere in events taking place within a country, especially when they 
present matters of humanitarian concern, without regard to notions of statehood and 
sovereignty. Also it has produced a greater willingness to assert and enforce broadly agreed 
international community policies and values. It has caused a greater reliance on trans-
sovereign solutions to international and civil armed conflict, human rights violations, and 
ecological disasters. (Mertus 1998: 333-334)  Consequently while state policies dominate the 
possibilities of the provision of aid, it is worth noting that there is a great number of forces 
both below and above the State, such as NGOs, with local and transnational consciousness, 
and transnational corporations, inter-governmental organizations, and regional collective 
arrangements which have an interest in issues related to humanitarian concerns, who 
participate in international, regional and national problem solving.  
 
                                                          
 
1 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,  
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons  
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.  
In 1999, UNHCR launched a campaign to promote accession to the 1951 Convention that culminated on its 50th anniversary 
in July 2001 and the Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention on 12 and 13 December 2001. 
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It is thus possible to recognize UNHCR and other actors in the field as generators of 
alternative programs which are designed to meet the concerns of governments and avoid the 
encampment of refugees 
 
Summing-up on this section, we have tried to draw up different approaches to understand the 
political field in which the international refugee regime is situated. It is of great importance 
for understanding the following sections in which we will discuss the barriers and 
possibilities for alternatives to camps in situations of large influx of refugees into a country.  
Voluntary repatriation 
Voluntary repatriation is often deemed as the most durable solution to refugee issues, and has 
been favored by host countries and donors, because normalcy is regained when refugees 
return to their country of origin and re-avail themselves of national protection and regain 
their citizenship rights. Also refugees often prefer to return if only provided with the 
necessary assistance to make a safe return and to reintegrate in their home country. Host 
countries therefore often only offer temporary settlement while waiting for voluntary 
repatriation to become possible, and UNHCR is engaged in activities which aim to promote 
such safe repatriation and reintegration. (Abdi 2005: 29; Barbero 1993: 8; Chimni 2003: 204; 
Keely 1996: 1058; UNHCR 2004: 7 – repatriation handbook) 
To develop programs which aim the enabling conditions for repatriation, and mobilization of 
support for returnees can prove to be a very good alternative to have asylum seekers languish 
in countries of asylum awaiting negative responses to asylum requests. (UNHCR 2011b: 31-
33; Barbero 1993: 7) Barbero states that humanitarian programs of repatriation have showed 
that complete peace in the country of origin is not always a prerequisite for return, for 
reintegration and for development programs. On the contrary refugees who return freely to 
their homeland can make an important contribution to the economic recovery of war-torn 
societies and fill positions vital for development and nation-building. (Barbero 1993: 8; Crisp: 
2000: 17) It is believed that returnees in the world’s poorer countries may not bring a great 
deal of financial or physical capital with them when they arrive in their country of origin, but 
that they often possess a considerable amount of human and social capital which will benefit 
the society they return to and contribute positively to the initial recovery process in the 
region. (Crisp 2000:17) Voluntarily return of qualified and skilled refugees to less than ideal 
conditions can serve as an important step towards the reconstruction and peacebuilding 
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process, and to have skilled refugees returning to help with the reconstruction of the country 
is also a more efficient use of development funds and implies a longer term pay-off and 
transfer of knowledge and skills. (Barbero 1993: 10) 
Repatriation assistance programmes 
Repatriation depends for its legitimacy and effectiveness on conditions in the home countries 
and on the refugees’ willingness to return. For the promotion of repatriation to be a durable 
alternative to long time of encampment the voluntary character of the return has to be 
insured. UNHCR can play an important role in verifying that the refugees make a free and 
informed choice. Refoulement should be avoided and the refugees’ decision to repatriate is 
not supposed to be coerced by factors such as the asylum situation in the host country, lack of 
or reduction in assistance. (UNHCR 2011b: 31-33; Loescher 1993: 149)  
 
Next, if repatriation of refugees is supposed to benefit both refugees and the country of origin 
repatriation must entail more than just the return to one's homeland. It should also entail 
reintegration, which is the ability of the returnees to secure the necessary political, economic, 
legal and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity. (Barbero 1993: 8; 
UNHCR 2004: 8) Close cooperation between development agencies in both hosting and 
receiving countries and with government social services is therefore necessary to ensure the 
safe and productive return of refugees. Focusing on safety of the return, reintegration and 
development might also involve a further rethinking of the roles and mandates of 
international organizations and NGOs. It will entail a close cooperation and coordination 
between development and refugee agencies and an enhancement and sharing of the resources 
available for them. Assistance programmes relating to repatriation will involve a shift of 
operational priorities from receiving countries to countries of return. Another task for a 
repatriation programme is the reintegration into civilian society of former soldiers and 
refugee warriors, and the capacity to deal quickly and effectively with the often massive 
number of landmines planted during the course of wars would have to be developed. 
(Loescher 1993: 204:) 
 
If refugee assistance programmes manage to voluntarily return and reintegrate certain skilled 
groups of refugees to serve as a “first strike” team during times of fragile peace, such 
returnees might facilitate the reintegration of other returning refugees, and set in place the 
necessary accompanying infrastructure. Thus, it is also suggested that repatriation 
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programmes should provide training for returnees with entrepreneurial skills and assist them 
in establishing small-scale enterprises. These programs would thereby help to start up much 
needed development activities. (Barbero 1993: 11) 
Barriers for repatriation 
Though repatriation could seem to be a durable alternative to long time encampment of 
refugees, programmes to promote repatriation suffer from several constraints. In this section 
we will point to some of the barriers for the promotion of voluntary repatriation. 
Collaboration with the country of origin 
Finding an end to exile through voluntary repatriation in safety and with dignity requires the 
full commitment of the country of origin to help reintegrate its own people. This fact reveals 
that there is a strong political element inherent in voluntary repatriation (Web 8: UNHCR; 
Stein 1986: 269). The conflicts which cause refugee flows in recent times are more often 
conflicts within states than between states. In these conflicts civilians are often used as 
weapons and targets in warfare, and large-scale displacements comprise a political strategy in 
claiming control over territory. Mass population displacements have in recent conflicts been 
the explicit objective of the warring parties. Refugees are often accomplished through gross 
human rights and humanitarian violations, including conspicuous atrocity, systematic rape, 
hostage-taking, forced starvation and siege, destruction of religious and historic monuments, 
the use of shells and rockets against civilian targets and use of land-mines to make large areas 
uninhabitable. (Mertus 1998: 332) 
Consequently, it can be difficult for many to go home in safety and rebuild their lives in a 
stable environment. Many refugees cannot go home until substantial changes in the country of 
origin occur, such as the overthrow of a tyrant, independence, a change of regimes or after the 
agreement of new constitutions and peace treaties. Stability and safety is neither easy nor 
quickly established and the political causes of flight might never disappear. Even where a 
peace agreement has been signed, the full halting of violence, the re-establishment of normal 
political, economic and social life, the rehabilitation of the legal and judicial system, respect 
for human rights, and long-term stability may still take considerable time. While peace is a 
sufficient condition for the return of those who flee conflict, regime change is needed for 
political exiles. Return will usually be impossible for many victims of revolutionary change 
and for ethnic groups that have been rejected or expelled. (Stein 1986: 269-270; UNHCR 
2011b:32) 
28 
 
 
Crisp further points to a number of insecurities the returnees risk to meet in the home 
country. War-torn societies are often characterized by lack of rule of law, banditry and violent 
crime and high levels of social tension and thereby physical and psychological insecurity and 
returnees may be particularly vulnerable. Further, refugees and displaced people rarely 
possess many resources when they go back to their homes, and when they arrive in their 
place of origin, they must survive in an environment which often has been laid waste by 
armed conflict. Consequently they risk suffering from material insecurity. Also the returning 
refugees and displaced people often experience several forms of legal insecurity by the lack 
official documentation such as proof of their nationality, identity cards or deed to their former 
property - a situation in which they may not be recognized as citizens of the country to which 
they return, and thereby will lack the protection of the state. It will place them at risk of 
arbitrary arrest, prevent them from voting, finding a job, gaining access to credit, moving 
freely round in the country, and to go back to the place which they consider to be their home. 
(Crisp 2000: 18-19) 
 
The countries of origin, rather than being in a ‘post-conflict’ situation, most are in the grip of 
chronic political emergencies. They are “quasi-states”, whose governments are deficient in the 
political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights or provide 
socio-economic welfare. (Jackson 1990: 164 – 198) These governments may not be in a 
position to assume responsibility for the reintegration of returning refugees and they may 
also be unwilling to do so, because in the same way as refugee influxes can have an effect on 
security in the host country, large-scale repatriations may have negative consequences on the 
country of origin. They can place a substantial burden on areas which are ill-equipped to 
absorb the new arrivals, leading to increased competition for and conflict over scarce 
resources, and they can produce destabilizing changes in a society’s ethnic or communal 
balance. (Crisp 2000: 19; Chimny 1999: 13,18)  
Collaboration between humanitarian and development assistance 
Despite the positive effects a greater cooperation between agencies of development and 
refugee assistance could have in relation to the repatriation of refugees, Crisp is quite critical 
to this notion. Referring to an unpublished paper prepared for UNHCR, he questions if UNHCR 
should be involved in something as complex and difficult as a long-term development process. 
Instead he suggest that  the organization should limit itself to provide returnees with the 
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assistance required to make the successful transition from asylum country to country of 
origin, ensure that the returnees are reintegrated into the national system of protection and 
then leave their social and economic reintegration to national and international development 
agencies. (Crisp 2000: 17)  
To ensure reintegration of refugees and rehabilitation in the country of origin there is a need 
to address the factors which are responsible for the problems in the country and which have 
contributed to create the climate in which displacement took place. However much 
development assistance suffers from an inability to work effectively in quasi-states. This 
structural problem derives both from the uncertain legitimacy of many governments in 
conflict-affected states, and their weak public institutions and the absolute poverty of the 
formal economy. Large-scale aid therefore will need to be offered to the country, to which 
refugees are returning. Crisp and Chimni argue that with its limited resources UNHCR can at 
best pursue limited developmental objectives, and cannot address the structural problems in 
the country of origin. Addressing military and political issues lie beyond the competence and 
mandate of UNHCR, which is designed to provide protection and emergency assistance. (Crisp 
2000: 17-18; Chimny 1999: 15)  
 
Even though poor host states press for repatriation of refugees because they don’t have the 
capacity themselves to provide for the refugees and are confronted with a situation in which 
Northern states also launch restrictive asylum policies, there is no guarantee that the phasing 
out of humanitarian assistance will be paralleled by a concomitant rise in development aid. 
Many aid operations responding to chronic political emergencies have been experiencing 
sustained declines in their funding. This is a threat to the voluntary character of the 
repatriation. Imposed return has become necessary because of a lack of money to care for 
refugees, which have resulted in a situation where the protection and assistance available has 
been so inadequate that refugees have preferred to return to continuing insecurity at home. In 
such circumstances, they can hardly be said to have exercised a free choice, and the solution of 
repatriation loses its legitimacy. (Crisp 2000:18; Chimny 1999:  11) 
Resettlement  
 
Resettlement is the third durable solution UNHCR is mandated to implement in cooperation 
with states, and imply transferring refugees from the country in which they have sought 
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asylum to another state that has agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence 
status. The resettlement country provides the refugee and his/her family with legal and 
physical protection, including access to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
similar to those enjoyed by nationals. (Web: 1 UNHCR) 
According to Kristin Bergtora Sanvik, there has throughout most of UNHCR’s history been a 
consistent gap between promoted and preferred durable solutions. She states that until 1985, 
voluntary repatriation was the preferred solution, but resettlement was the solution 
promoted in practice. From the mid-1980s a change occurred and resettlement became the 
least preferred option in both policy and practice, however, only until resurgence of this 
solution in the late 1990s. (Sandvik 2010: 21) From then, African refugees have been resettled 
by UNHCR in great numbers to Australia, Canada and the US. (Sandvik 2010: 21- 22) In the 
2011 Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR states that a global progress in resettlement has taken 
place: ”Over the past sixty years, millions of people have been provided with the opportunity to 
build new lives for themselves, and their families, through resettlement” . (UNHCR 2011a: 4) 
 
UNHCR’s “global trend report from 2013” (UNHCR 2013: 2) shows that over the course of 
2012, only 526,000 refugees returned voluntarily (the number is  lower than those of all other  
years in the past decade) (Ibid: 2), which is a small amount out of the 7.6 million newly 
displaced persons (Ibid: 1), making resettlement seem like the future solution. If neither 
repatriation nor local integration is possible, because the refugees face continued persecution, 
or the authorities in the host country are unable or unwilling to provide effective protection, 
then relocation through resettlement becomes a means of protecting refugees and ensure 
protection against refoulement. (Web 1: UNHCR)  
 
While there in the past decade have been a growing number of asylum seekers, due to more 
refugees and IDP’s, the number of people granted with asylum have not grown with the same 
speed. (UNHCR 2011a: 68) Many refugees seek resettlement in a third country because the 
rights of refugees enshrined in the 1951 convention cannot be realized in the country of first 
asylum: rights such as freedom of movement, employment, or higher education. It may also be 
that many refugees do not feel safe in their country of first asylum. (Harrall-Bond 1986: 54)  
Resettlement in a globalized world 
It is not easy to obtain resettlement because nearly all governments of the world are 
becoming increasingly restrictive toward refugees and in their asylum policies.  Many donor 
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countries push for the durable solutions of local settlement or voluntary repatriation. (Betts et 
al. 2012: 147; Harrall-Bond 1989: 43-44) Donors restrict resettlement for much the same 
reasons as the hosts are hesitant about settlement: concerns over cost in times of economic 
difficulty, doubts about assimilating those so culturally different, and belief that the numbers 
are too great to absorb, and concerns of security. (Stein 1986: 268) Many host governments, 
in both North and South, now present refugee populations as security threats to justify 
restrictive policies that would not otherwise be permissible. (Betts et al. 2012: 147)  
Refugees and asylum-seekers are highly affected by the measures of control on irregular 
migration posed in the 1980s. Security concerns of states have been at the forefront for the 
past decades, including more restricted policies towards asylum seekers (UNHCR 2011a: 68-
69), which could be based on what Agamden describes as ‘fearism’ – e.g. the fear of refugees 
having a negative effect on either the culture, religion, economy or security of one country. 
Therefore, the solution of resettlement is highly politicized, since UNHCR identifies refugees 
in need of resettlement as part of its mandate, but it is the states that offer permanent places 
of residence in their countries. Resettlement is not a right enshrined in the Geneva 
Convention, and there is no legally obligation on states to accept refugees through 
resettlement, and only a limited number of states offer resettlement on a regular basis, 
allocating budgets, devising programmes and providing annual resettlement quotas. (UNHCR 
2011a: 5)  
 
Receiving states tend to focus less about the human rights of the refugees and more about 
their own rights, like the right to protect their own culture and standard of living from the 
foreign intruders since refugees are often resettled to countries where the society, language 
and culture are completely different. (Mertus 1998: 328; Web 5: UNHCR)  
Willingness to host refugees through resettlement programmes can be a tangible expression 
of international solidarity and allowing states to help share responsibility for refugee 
protection and reduce problems impacting the country of asylum (UNHCR 2011a: 36), but 
also western countries express concerns about their generosity in providing homes to large 
numbers of refugees from other regions, and that the influx of refugees cause deterioration of 
the values which underpin democratic systems. Instead of offering refugees resettlement, 
donors pay the hosts to keep the refugees and urge them to find the political will to integrate 
the refugees. (Harrall-Bond 1989: 52; Stein 1986: 268) 
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While one might be very sceptical about the possibility that the western states will start 
granting more people asylum, one should remember, out from a more liberal/globalist 
perspective, the whole arrangement of resettlement through UNHCR is a process that is made 
with many partners involved, and that it is therefore not only the sovereignty of states that 
plays an important role. Resettlement is a global undertaking that involves not only 
resettlement countries, but also UNHCR, NGO’s and IOM (International Organization for 
Migration). Furthermore, it should be noted that when applying for asylum, the process does 
not start in the western country where one wishes to gain asylum, but in the country where 
the refugee are being hosted. Therefore the access to being registered as refugee in the first 
place is also of significant importance. (Sandvik 2010: 20)  
The issue of resettlement does therefore reach further than to the border of a host country. It 
involves various forms of coordination and planning, as well as political negotiation. (UNHCR 
2011a: 113)  In this matter UNHCR plays an important role, as they have sought to draw 
states attention to the issue of sustainable resettlement and integration, and are furthermore 
hosting a lot of resettlement activities worldwide. (UNHCR 2011a: 113) In this perspective the 
issue of resettlement lies in the hand of UNHCR and other NGO’s, but because UNHCR lacks 
funding, they miss an important tool when advocating western countries for granting more 
refugees asylum, because when UNHCR is in lack of funding, they do not possess the ability to 
offer help in facilitating the process of settlement and integration.  
The future of resettlement 
While the international humanitarian regime has some potential in promoting refugee’s 
rights, it is still states in the last end that has to grant the asylum or citizenship. Presently, 
only a very small percentage of refugees are granted with asylum, so if resettlement really 
must have its break-through, something must be changed on the international political scene. 
In this regard we are not only referring to the fact that states need to change their ‘discourse’ 
about refugees as dangerous, but also that states start realizing the potential threat of human 
smuggling etc. that grows when more people are denied asylum, and thereby tries to gain 
access illegally. According to Mervyn Frost, the whole debate about nation-states is outdated. 
He talks about a new global practice of global citizenship where any citizen can claim their 
right to stay in any state, as we are all part of a globalized world. (Frost 2003: 116) According 
to him, which is also correct due to statistics, the number of migrants or internationally 
displaced, arriving in European countries is far from big enough to pose a serious threat 
towards the states where they are arriving. (Ibid: 117) he argues that “respect for people as 
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rights holders does not stop at the frontiers of our own state. We regard society of rights holders 
as stretching far beyond the borders of our immediate states”. (Ibid: 124) If that is the case, then 
the issue of asylum (or lack of it) is more a question of the international humanitarian regime 
not doing enough in this field.  
 
But initiatives such as the “Linking-In EU resettlement project”, which is a project between 
European member states, UNHCR and NGOs on the improvement of resettlement to refugees 
in Europe (Web 22: EU) proves that there is a focus on the promotion of resettlement, and 
with the campaign ’Resettlement saves lifes’(Web 23: EU), the European Union is trying to 
promote resettlement within the borders of the Union. Also Sanvik states that “African 
resettlement candidate as a quasi-juridical category has been forged, reshaped and distributed 
through international initiatives since the inception of the modern refugee regime” (Sandvik 
2010: 23). She states here that it is due to the international society, the evolvement of 
resettlement in international refugee management, the configuration of African refugees in 
UNHCR’s interventions and the renewal and reform of resettlement of the mid-1990s that 
have secured greater inclusion of African refugees towards resettlement. (Ibid: 21 – 23)  
 
Local integration in host state 
Local integration entails that the refugees legally, economically and socially integrate in the 
host country, availing themselves of the national protection of the host government in the 
country of asylum and receive assistance to settle in order to live independently within the 
community, and are therefore granted a progressively wider range of rights. Local integration 
can thereby offer a durable solution to the plight, and make the refugees less dependent on 
aid by becoming increasingly self-reliant. (UNHCR 2011b: 34-36; Web 4: UNHCR) 
According to UNHCR “Local integration is not only a logical solution for refugees, it is also a tool 
to enhance future security and stability for all the people”. (UNHCR 2008: 33) This solution has 
earlier received relatively little attention, partly based on the fact that the immense influxes of 
refugees in the 90s made such a solution highly difficult. (Crisp & Fielden 2001: 78) However, 
in 2005 the UNHCR added new attention to this solution. The Executive committee of UNHCR 
agreed that local integration were a very comprehensive approach to refugee problems, and 
therefore urged agencies and host states to work more proactively towards local integration. 
(Ibid: 78) 
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According to UNHCR local integration is an opportunity for refugees to integrate, belong, be 
self-reliant and contribute socially and economically to their host country. (UNHCR 2008: 5) 
Even though it should be noted, that local integration doesn’t equal social integration 
automatically (Smith 2012: 483), Lisa Malkki claims that refugees has the ability to adopt,  
and that the globalized world make people less bound to their territorial state of origin. 
(Malkki 1992: 24 – 25) Still other scholars argue that integration and belonging is not easily 
obtained, and for refugees to contribute socially and economically there need to be a social 
setting that they can relate to, and a job they can achieve.  (Smith 2010: 483) For that reason, 
the issue of local integration goes further than the political decision of letting somebody 
integrate locally. 
 As stated earlier, states use arguments relating to security and environment as factors that 
can prevent the success of local integration; desire to protect scarce resources, risk of security 
problems, and potential antagonism towards refugees among the local population.  (UNHCR 
2011b: 35) That said, we also mentioned earlier that in some cases the actual number of 
refugees are not big enough to threat national security, while in other regions of the world, 
the masses of refugees are so big, that the security concerns might be well-founded.  
If local integration is to be a viable solution, it requires agreement by the host country 
concerned and that is why national governments’ interests can make up a constraint on this 
solution. Countries of asylum are often hesitant to grant refugees permanent residency even 
when it is clear that repatriation is far off or unlikely. Host governments may prefer 
temporary settlement, where the refugees are only allowed to remain in the country while 
waiting for voluntary repatriation to become feasible, because it delays a commitment and 
may be more acceptable to domestic political forces. (Stein 1986: 273)  
As discussed earlier in the critique of camps, encampment can make refugees ’dangerous’ 
because they become desperate from the poor conditions and lack of future prospects in the 
camps. The argument that issues of security makes up a barrier for local integration can thus 
be questioned since keeping refugees in camps also can pose a threat to security.  
 
In order to promote local integration as a durable solution, UNHCR have made the 
Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) - a program made on the recognition that aid 
towards refugees and development aid can be combined. (UNHCR 2005a: foreword) 
The aim is to address both concerns relating to refugees and host communities in 
development agendas by mobilizing additional development assistance and improve burden-
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sharing with countries hosting a large number of refugees. The goal is to secure a better 
quality of life and self-reliance for refugees, while preparing for either repatriation or asylum 
and to contribute to poverty eradication in refugee-hosting communities. (Ibid: 24) The 
strategy is to promote assistance to refugees as an integral part of poverty-focused local and 
national development plans. (Ibid: 7) The goal is to create conditions for refugees to pursue 
productive livelihoods, i.e. freedom of movement, access to jobs and services (health, 
education, etc.), and productive resources (i.e. land) and promote a rights-based approach. At 
the same time the strategy should respond to national and district development objectives of 
poverty reduction and social and economic progress, trough integration in to development 
plans and programmes (UNHCR 2005a: 8) 
Bearing in mind, that local integration becomes a more desirable option to host-states, when 
it is supported with development aid - and local integration thereby can be a strategic 
economic decision for host states - we wish to look into different cases of local integration. We 
wish to understand in which cases local integration have been a feasible solution, in order to 
get closer to the determination of, whether local integration is really a valuable option in all 
situations.  
 
Cases of local integration 
Guinea 
By the refugee crisis in Guinea in the year 1989 and the years that followed, the government 
of Guinea implemented an alternative strategy towards receiving refugees. Despite the fact 
that yet 500.000 refugees arrived from boarding Liberia and Sierra Leone, the government, 
instead of forming parallel service systems to support refugees, rewarded the villages that 
welcomed refugees with financial support. (Harrell Bond 2000: 10) By that policy, the 
government managed to boom the economy of the forest region of Guinea, and avoiding the 
encampment of large amount of people. Most of the refugees had a high degree of autonomy, 
and were able to participate in the local economy. By 1994 only one-third of normal food 
rations were given out, while no signs of malnutrition among refugees. UNHCR, instead of 
spending funding on large camps, could invest in local health care structures, making the 
health-care system in the forest region the best in the region, an advantage to both refugees 
and local population. (Van Damme 1995: 361) 
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Thailand 
Human geographer Richard Black also highlights local integration, though still in frame of 
‘camps’. He is paying special notice to small open refugee settlements on the Thai-Burma 
border and agricultural settlements of refugees around the African continent. The positive 
aspects of such camps are that they are less dependent on assistance, and in some cases even 
can be self-reliant. By supporting more open camps, were refugees are given a better chance 
to integrate locally and being self-sufficient, states and agencies seek to strengthen existing 
service structures rather than a military-style camp regime as he define large closed camps. 
(Black 1998: 7) His overall suggestion and wish is to promote policies that engage refugees 
and local populations in project design and implementation. (Black 1998: 7) 
Tanzania 
The Tanzanian government have shown an example on how host-states can work proactively 
towards local integration. Recently they have reversed a longstanding policy, which now 
makes it possible for the ’1972’ Burundi’s to stay in the country, which otherwise would 
eventually have to repatriate, even if they had been born in Tanzania. With the introduction of 
a new and radically different policy, initiated by Home Affairs Minister Joseph Mugnai, the 
‘1972 Burundians’ have now been offered the opportunity to acquire Tanzanian citizenship. 
By that, we are talking about some 170,000 refugees who seem likely to avail themselves of 
this opportunity. It is a UNHCR donation of some $16 million for activities in support of the 
local integration and naturalisation of the refugees that have made such changes in policy 
possible, (Crisp & Fielden 2001: 78) 
Tanzania though, is not alone in promoting policies of local integration. Also in Angola 
authorities indicated their willingness to give permanent residence right to more than 14.000 
refugees and in Namibia the government has suggested the establishment of a pilot local 
integration project for around 500 Angolan refugees. (Ibid: 78) 
 
Several other examples, from Greece, Cyprus, India and Nepal can be made, of countries that 
were all underdeveloped but still managed to integrate large amounts of refugees into the 
local population, and managed to use aid money in a way that benefited both refugees and 
local population by investing it in already existing structures. (Harrell-Bond 2000: 11) And 
also examples within an African context such as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Uganda, Sudan and 
Malawi can be made, of countries who have sought to use the policy of dispersed settlement. 
(Black 1998: 5) 
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By looking at these alternatives some scholars might argue that those cases were only 
possible due to the small numbers of refugees received, like in Thailand, Namibia or Angola, 
or to the fact that the culture of the refugees were to a large extend very similar to the one of 
the local population. Yet, in the case of Kenya the government managed to integrate about 
170.000 refugees into the state, supported by the funding of UNHCR. This leads us back to the 
connection between refuge management and development, since the case of Kenya were 
made possible due to integration programs and economic support by UNHCR to already 
existing structures. In sum, it seems as if there are various arguments regarding whether local 
integration is possible or not. It can all be boiled down to the issue of political discussions – 
because where there is a will there is a way. Knowing that governments uses various 
arguments in order to avoid granting asylum and thereby not making local integration 
possible, we now wish to look into the consequences of denying local integration. 
Self-settlement and camp cities  
By looking at  a case of ‘self-settlement’ from Uganda, we wish to look into what other choices 
refugees have, when local integration is not promoted by one’s host state. In Uganda the 
UNHCR and Government of Uganda have been reluctant to allow refugees to integrate within 
the country, and while the government have argued that refugees are in the camps for their 
own security the refugees themselves does not experience that the label ‘refugee’ provide 
them with any form of protection, whereas they turn to self-settlement and try to blend in 
with the local population. In praxis it means that they avoid registering as refugees to not be 
forced to live in camps. Instead they can live in the city, earn money and make a living. The 
general view from many Rwandan ‘refugees’ is that the camp is only for those worst off, who 
by no chance have the capability to provide for their own living, or build a new life from 
scratch. They become dependent on the food provided in the camp, and incapable of fighting 
for a better living. (Hovil 2007: 604 – 608) Despite their chances of finding employment, 
refugees of self-settlement are exceedingly vulnerable to exploitation and arbitrary arrest due 
to their illegal situation, and many will have to bribe local officials for permanent papers. On 
the other hand, being in camps in many cases includes restrictions on movements and makes 
it hard to do business, which, as mentioned earlier, poses a great barrier for self-sufficiency. 
(Ibid: 608-609) 
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The overshadowing argument for self-settlement made by Hovil is that if the option of self-
settlement was legally recognized, and assistance channelled to both the refugees and their 
hosts aside from the settlement structures, there would be a real possibility that refugees 
would integrate within the local economies, which would both benefit the refugees and the 
local economy. Furthermore, when able to participate in the local economy, many refugees 
send home remittances, and thereby also support development in their country of origin. 
Currently, remittances are double the size of aid worldwide, while states could start seeing 
remittances as an important feature before trying to exclude them from any economic activity. 
(Nyberg-Sørensen 2002: 5) According to Hovil, the refusal to allow refugees to self-settle is a 
failure on the part of government to implement its international legal obligations. Legally 
speaking, self-settled refugees exist, and they are simply expressing what they believe to be 
their best interest. (Hovil 2007: 619) The issues of economic participation and the ability to 
send home remittances thereby points out how a concerted refugee and development policy 
could benefit refugees, their hosts and their country of origin. (Ibid: 619) 
It should be noted of course, that self-settlement is illegal due to international law, and that 
those who do so fall under the term of illegal immigrants – when not granted with refugee 
papers. On the other hand it proves that refugees, like all other human beings, seek to find 
livelihoods were it seems most profitable, and that refugees therefore cannot be controlled as 
such. Large camps’ transferring into open cities proofs the same.  It shows that despite 
encampment of refugees being chosen as an active policy, governments cannot make sure that 
the refugees stays inside this zone of control. They will move outside the camps in order to 
seek opportunities of employment, and the camps might therefore grow into big trading 
centres. (De Montclos 2000: 206) The conclusion to the issues of self-settlement and camps as 
cities is that while government might have their reason not to persuade any of the UNHCR 
durable solutions, they (the government and international humanitarian regime) should be 
aware of the social and economic process that follows when encampment is used as strategy 
of hosting refugees. Refugees are not objectives, but human resources that moves in space and 
over time, as Appadurai would explain it. Therefore neither the movement of refugees nor the 
development of camps can be controlled as such. By that, it should be underlined that placing 
refugees in camps doesn’t prevent them from taking part in economic or social activity.  
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Summing up 
The characteristics of refugee camps are criticized for cutting into refugee’s possibilities for 
self-sufficiency, which is expensive for the aid agencies and have psychological consequences 
for the refugees. Over time camps transform into city-like settlements, but lack of formal legal 
recognition constraint the camps of becoming viable urban settlements. Further refugees in 
camps are affected by variety of threats to their physical security both from epidemics and 
widespread violence. We have discussed how refugees pose a challenge to the international 
political system, because people in this system are supposed to be under protection within the 
boundaries of their states. In theory asylum seekers should be protected by international 
protocols as soon as they cross national frontiers to seek refuge in another country. However, 
while refugees have a right to seek asylum, states do not have an obligation to grant it.  
UNHCR is believed to constitute a safety net that ensures that people can cross an 
international border to access fundamental human rights, but UNHCR faces the fundamental 
challenge of persuading states to share the burden of refugee protection. Only states can grant 
asylum and civil rights to refugees. Global cooperation around refugee issues has become 
more difficult because governments in affected low-income host states are unwilling to offer 
asylum, when also richer countries are restrictive in their asylum policies.  
We have discussed the role of UNHCR both from a neo-realistic/skeptic and liberal/globalist 
approach. We found that the organization can be understood both as highly inefficient in the 
sense that it is dependent on the states that fund it, and consequently cannot act only in the 
interests of refugees, but also is a tool to enable the burden-sharing and promote the states 
willingness to assist all refugees in need of protection. However, the organization face 
challenges by working in a highly politicized field while having a strict non-political mandate.  
Strict asylum policies and the failure of the international refugee regime to provide durable 
solutions for refugees are partly explained by ‘fearism’ and the separation between 
humanitarian concerns and politics. The perception that refugees can threaten the well-being 
of a state has been normalized, and this perception/fear justifies that the protection of 
refugees is not of high priority and that their rights are being violated. We have further 
discussed the barriers and possibilities for alternatives to camps in situations of large influx of 
refugees into a country. 
Voluntary repatriation is a preferred solution because normalcy in the international system of 
states and citizens is regained. Further returnees can make an important contribution to the 
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economic recovery of the war-torn society in the home country and fill positions vital for 
development and nation-building. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees entail a close 
cooperation and coordination between development and refugee agencies, and it can serve as 
a more efficient use of development funds. However, it is difficult for many to go home in 
safety and rebuild their lives in a stable environment, and both humanitarian and 
development agencies are often not able to work efficiently in quasi-states, whose 
governments are deficient in the political will and institutional capacity to protect human 
rights.  
Many refugees seek resettlement in a third country when the rights of refugees cannot be 
realized in the country of first asylum. Yet nearly all governments of the world are becoming 
increasingly restrictive toward refugees and in their asylum policies because of ‘fearism’. 
Governments express concerns over cost, assimilating, scale, security, and deterioration of 
democratic values. There is no legally obligation on states to accept refugees through 
resettlement, which means that only a limited number of states offer resettlement, and tend to 
pay the hosts to keep the refugees. UNHCR hold resettlement activities worldwide, but 
because of lack of funding they do not possess much ability to offer help in facilitating the 
process of integration.  
Poor host countries’ fear of letting refugees put further strain on scarce resources and cause 
instability in the country makes them prefer to only offer temporary settlement in refugee 
camps instead of letting them integrate. However such encampment policy doesn’t 
automatically control refugees and prevent them from taking part in economic or social 
activity. Large camps are transferring into open cities, and the activities of the refugees can 
prove to benefit the surroundings. Positive experiences with local integration of refugees have 
been seen in several countries, and to promote this solution, aid programmes are 
implemented with the aim of addressing both concerns relating to refugees and host 
communities. 
All of these findings and discussions will we now put in context in the following study of the 
Dadaab camp in east Kenya.  
The Dadaab camp 
Dadaab is a name given to the three refugee camps: Hagadera, Ifo and Dhagahley, which are 
located about 100 km. from the Somali-Kenya border. (Abdi: 17) By August 2012 UNHCR 
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estimated a total of 405.478 refugees and asylum seekers in the Dadaab refugee camp. 
(UNHCR 2013: 2) 
 
 
The map shows the geographical location of the Dadaab camps 
 
The Dadaab camps are located in semi-arid areas, only sparsely populated by poor nomadic 
pastoralists, where the refugees easily outnumber the indigenous population. Within UNHCR 
there is a general understanding that camps should not reach above 20.000 inhabitants, which 
makes a camp as Dadaab target for huge critique. Despite the critical size of the camp, there is 
a general understanding that the refugees in Dadaab enjoy a better living than most local 
people in the area. (Crisp 2000: 618) Despite that claim, host and refugee communities 
overlap closely and their identities are intertwined. Many refugees in Dadaab share language, 
culture and religion with the local population, together with a common approach to property 
and sharing of resource use. While there is often focus on the banditry in the area, 
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relationships between refugees and hosts have evolved over time with a deep and intimate 
degree of overlap. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 67) 
Since the 1960’s there have been hostilities between Kenya and Somalia about the rights to 
the Northern Frontier District area, where the Dadaab camp is now located. Due to the 
tensions, and government of Somalia’s support to local independence movements in the area, 
Kenya kept the district and its population under a permanent state of emergency until 1992. 
(Abdi 2005: 18) But with the overthrow of Somalias’ Siyadd Barres regime in 1991 and the 
almost 420.000 refugees who arrived in the time after (Ibid: 17), Kenya was due to 
international conventions obliged to permit the refugees to enter. (Crisp 2000: 612) The 
government have prompted UNHCR to initiate a ‘cross-border assistance operation’ for the 
Somali refugees to go back to Somalia.  The idea was to promote a process of voluntary 
repatriation and to avoid new refugee influxes. Many refugees did return, while others stayed 
in camps along the coast, which grew into important economic centres. With time these camps 
were closed down, and refugees were moved to camps closer to the boarders of Somalia and 
Sudan. Some of these camps are what has now become the Dadaab camps (Ibid, Lindley 2011: 
20) 
The scale of refugee flight across the Kenyan border in the early 1990s overwhelmed both the 
small local nomadic population, and set pressure on the scare resources of the area around 
Dadaab. Nevertheless, the presence of international organizations in this previously 
marginalized region resulted in some attention, as they brought the provision of services such 
as boreholes, hospitals and schools. (Abdi 2005: 18) The initial creation of Dadaab camp in the 
Northern Eastern Region was thus part of a larger government strategy on attracting foreign 
aid to the area. (Kibreab 1993: 328, Lindley 2011: 20) 
Although Kenya never officially adopted a policy requiring refugees to stay in camps, it has in 
practice sustained an unmodified encampment policy since the mass refugee arrivals in the 
post-1991 era. While many arrived refugees have been directed to camps, others have 
migrated to urban centres to pursue education, to seek medical treatment or jobs, or simply to 
become anonymous. (Horn 2013: 19) 
 
The present situation in Dadaab camps 
Today, incidents involving death and serious injure take place on daily level in refugee camps 
all over Kenya. (Human Righs Center 2013: 8; Crisp 2000: 601) Dadaab camp is no different. 
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Circumstances of lack of security have had a serious impact of the welfare in the camps.  In 
recent years UNHCR have tried different preventive measures, in order to deal with the issues 
of security in the big camps. (Ibid: 615; Aubone 2013: 35-38)  The sort of insecurity that 
occurs in the camps account for domestic and community violence, sexual abuse and violence, 
armed robbery and violence within refugee groups. (Crisp 2000: 601 – 611, Lindley 2011: 34) 
Data on refugees in Dadaab confirms the deprivations refugees experience in protracted 
situations, and the World Food Program often raises concern about the impending starvation 
of refugees in Dadaab. (Abdi 2005: 21) The humanitarian situation in Dadaab is very critical, 
and UNHCR lacks funding to provide refugees with sufficient food, and in generally uphold a 
minimum level of security in the camp. (Lindley 2011: 32 - 33) On the one hand there is no 
doubt that the humanitarian situation in Dadaab is very critical, and that UNHCR lacks funding 
to provide refugees with sufficient food, and in general uphold a minimum level of security in 
the camp. (Ibid: 32 - 33) On the other hand, the situation for people outside the camp is just as 
bad, or even worse. And while officially only those within the camp can benefit from the food 
stipend given by UNHCR, it have been proofed that at least 40.500 host community members 
(27%) within 50 km are believed to hold refugee ration cards (Enghoff et. Al. 2010: 68), 
demonstrating that the camp and the aid given there, also benefits the local population. 
 
Refugees are not allowed to work, though it is a fact that many refugees in Dadaab camp still 
find a way to earn some money, by engaging in informal sale of goods and services, including 
food rations provided by UNHCR. (Montclos 2000: 2013, Lindley 2011: 40) Some manage to 
travel to the cities for work while many do not leave the camps and thereby become 
dependent on the aid provided by UNHCR, this is a situation with less acute poverty than in 
other comparable rural areas. (Abdi 2005: 22; Lindley 2011: 20) Fewer than 3% of 
households have no livestock at all.  However, dependency on free food, services and donor-
funded projects is more pronounced than in other comparable rural areas and livelihoods 
have been shaped by the presence of the refugee operation, specifically due to the scale of 
pastoral trade, free and subsidised food and access to services. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 69) 
Dadaab has developed significantly over the last 18 years, from a cluster of shelters to a busy 
regional centre. Trade activity has risen significantly and is expected to continue doing so. 
Property prices in the area are rising rapidly and roadside plots are being traded between 
different local entrepreneurs and refugees. (Ibid: 73) 
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These characteristics of the camps make Dadaab an interesting case in order to contextualize 
our findings from the first part of the study of possible durable solutions to mass influxes of 
refugees. We will now dig into the possibilities and barriers of repatriation, resettlement and 
local integration for the Somali refugees in Dadaab. Firstly we will assess the prospects of 
repatriation and resettlement, and thereafter turn to a discussion of integration into the 
Kenyan society.  
Somali repatriation  
Since the overthrow of  the regime of Siyadd Barres in 1991, Somalia have been engulfed by 
clanistic power struggles and lawlessness, and Somalia is still the country generating the 
second highest number of refugees in the world  and rated as the most failed state on the 
failed state index. Further, famine and severe food insecurity is widespread and has killed 
258,000 people between October 2010 and April 2012. (FFP 2013; EHCO Factsheet 2013; 
UNHCR 2013 Somalia fact sheet) Already in 2005 Abdi writes: “Somalia is still in a protracted 
political limbo as it enters its fifteenth year of “statelessness.” (Abdi 2005: 17). Given the 
political situation, Somalia faces many development challenges. Life expectancy is extremely 
low, infant and child mortality is extremely high and access to sanitation is limited. The 
number of internally displaced persons is around one million people. (Web 14: EEAS) 
In 2012 a new Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President, ending the 
phase of a transitional federal government. It was the country’s first free election since the 
military dictator Siyadd Barres took power in 1969, and recently an improvement of the 
situation in Somalia has taken place, and in particular Mogadishu have seen relative stability. 
(Ibid; DIS 2013: 9) 
The improved conditions in Somalia have generated positive expectations around the globe 
and have resulted in a number of Somali refugees living in the diaspora as well as internally 
displaced people returning to Mogadishu. However, the stability is fragile. The al-Qaeda linked 
Islamist group al-Shabaab still controls much of southern and central-Somalia, and has staged 
numerous suicide and grenade attacks in Mogadishu. (Ibid: 10) The critical issue is how the 
various clans have access to sources of income, and it is stated in the report from the Danish-
Norwegian fact-finding mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu in 2012 that as long as there are 
disgruntled individuals, there will be support for al-Shabaab. The new government can easily 
lose the momentum if they do not manage to fulfill the expectations that people have. They do 
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not have full control of what is going on and law and order is not yet established. Currently 
the government’s main focus is on issues in Mogadishu. (Ibid: 7-8) 
Even though the situation in Somalia has improved, lawlessness is still widespread. Soldiers 
are not being paid, the police are not present to protect people and sometimes persons are 
being randomly arrested, and both government soldiers and police are responsible for looting 
and rapes. (Ibid: 19, 37) However, in November 2013 a tripartite agreement between UNHCR, 
the government of Kenya and the Somali government was signed in order to start a process of 
voluntary repatriation. Refugees who are spontaneously returning to Somalia will be 
supported, and in Dadaab, return help-desks have been established to provide refugees with 
information and assistance on repatriation. (Web 9: UNHCR) Based on the assessment that 
Mogadishu is “safe enough” for refugees to return, Western countries correspondingly have 
begun to restrict their asylum policy towards Somali people. (Web 20: Information) It is 
believed that it is important for the stability and nation building in Somalia that well educated 
people in the diaspora return, because they might bring useful skills as well as money. (DIS 
2013: 69) UNDP are also implementing a program to enable Somalis with special expertise 
who live abroad to come to Somalia for teaching. (UM 2005: 22)  This understanding supports 
the earlier discussed idea of repatriation before complete stability presented by Barbero 
(1993) and Crisp (2000). Though, for repatriation to be a durable solution it has to be a 
voluntary process and relief and development activities should follow the refugees to ensure 
reintegration. This will indeed be necessary also in the case of Somali returnees, because they 
will encounter several insecurities. It is stated by NGOs working in Somalia that people 
returning from the diaspora will need to make sure that they have support from family, 
because they cannot count on support from the clan. People who have stayed abroad or 
people interacting with foreigners might also be at risk of being harmed by al-Shabaab, and 
people who earlier have left al-Shabaab cannot go back to the areas controlled by them. (DIS 
2013: 69-70) They might therefore risk to become internally displaced. In Mogadishu young 
people encounter insecurity, because the government is very vigilant of al-Shabaab attack, any 
young person who fit the perceived profile of an al-Shabaab militant risk being detained (Ibid: 
18).  
 
In the earlier discussed literature, it is suggested that a close cooperation between 
humanitarian agencies and agencies for development assistance could be enhanced to be 
more effectively in the support for reintegration of refugees in the war-torn countries of 
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return. In the Somalia case, it is difficult to imagine such a humanitarian-development 
approach. An interesting example in relation to this notion is the decision of the Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MFS) to close down all their medical programmes in Somalia. MSF is known 
to stay and work under the most difficult circumstances, but with several killings and attacks 
on staff members the organization chose to withdraw in august 2013 – few months before the 
tripartite agreement on repatriation programmes between UNHCR, and the Kenyan and 
Somali government, and at a moment when world leaders, for the first time in decades, 
express positive expectations to the development in the country. (Web 16: MFS) 
 
In the explanation for the withdraw given by Dr. Unni Karunaka, President of MSF 
International, he states: “MFS is not an organization that comments on the political or economic 
progress. We focus first and foremost on the health of people and their ability to find medical 
care when they need it. From that perspective, (…) there simply is no good news. Large parts of 
the Somali population live with undernourishment, disease and injury. They have little chance of 
finding quality health care when they need it” (Ibid) 
The quote shows the non-political nature of the humanitarian work. From this perspective the 
conditions in the country are not ameliorated, quite the contrary. The situation is viewed 
differently from a political and development point of view. E.g. the EU engagement in Somalia 
focus on building democratic structures and strong administrations (Web 14: EEAS), and from 
this perspective the newly political institutional development in Somalia is a reason to stay 
engaged in the country.  
Humanitarian agencies do not have a political agenda and assistance is not given conditionally 
as development aid is. The withdraw of MSF leaves the Somali refugees in Kenya with even 
less possibility of a safe return, and the agency’s decision thus works against the political 
preferred solution of “repatriation for development”. (Web 16: MFS) The cooperation 
between development and humanitarian agencies can thus be difficult, because they do not 
work according to the same agendas. Development aid address the institutional and structural 
causes of conflict and flight, while humanitarian agencies only do ‘symptom treatment’ in the 
sense that they address the negative consequences of conflicts. Humanitarian agencies and the 
non-political agenda can be too fragile to work in an insecure environment like Somalia. This 
remark support the conclusion by Crisp (2000), which we discussed earlier, that UNHCR 
might not be able to engage in something as complex and difficult as a long-term development 
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process in a quasi-state, but instead should leave this task to the diplomacy and specialized 
aid agencies.  
 
The situation in Somalia also shows the separation of politics from humanitarian concerns. Al-
Shabaab’s attack on MSF-clinics and doctors are of cause an extreme example of inhuman 
actions in order to reach political objectives of power to build an Islamic state– or of bio-
politics and the distinction between bios (citizen) and zoe (homo sacer) – but this separation is 
also shown by the fact that western countries make further restrictions on the requirements 
for Somali people to obtain asylum, and that Somali repatriation programmes are being 
promoted by governments, at the same time as MSF finds it too dangerous to operate in the 
country, and comments that there is no other country in the world where security risks are so 
high. (Ibid) Also both the Danish Refugee Council and Amnesty International believe that it is 
too early to begin to return refugees to Somalia from camps in neighboring countries like 
Kenya. (DIS 2013: 70; Amnesty international 2013) 
Resettlement of Somali refugees  
In relation to the restrictions on the asylum policies made by western countries, it is 
interesting to look at an article published by Amnesty International short after the 9/11. In 
the article they accuse governments of raising further obstacles to prevent asylum-seekers 
gaining access to their territory in the name of terrorism. In the article it is written: “Some 
governments are exploiting the climate of public fear to tighten up asylum laws and policies”. 
Amnesty International urges governments to remember to ensure that the human rights of all 
people are respected in their response to terrorist attacks and in their security policies, and 
that the human toll of “war on terror” do not fall on those who are the most vulnerable such as 
refugees and asylum-seekers who are themselves fleeing repression and terror. (Web 18: 
Amnesty International) 
This notion of strict asylum and immigration policies as a result of fear of terrorism is 
interesting in relation to the earlier discussion on “fearism”, which was understood as the 
normalization of fear of a certain group of people, and which justify policies that deny these 
persons particular rights in order to control them or keep them at a distance (The 
Guantanamo-base is an extreme example of this policy of fear). If strict asylum policies are a 
result of fear of terrorism, Somali refugees might have a particular hard time in obtaining 
asylum and resettlement. Fear and xenophobia towards Somali people might have been 
enhanced with the Somali terror group Al-Shabaab’s recent terror attack in Kenya, 
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the massacre in September that took 67 lives at a Nairobi shopping mall (Web 19: CNN), and 
the widespread piracy attacks on international ships. Further it is feared that Somalia has 
become a “safe-heaven” for terrorists and training for terrorism. 
It is also stated in a report from 2005 on the strengthening of Refugee Protection published by 
UNHCR and the EU that there is a problem of stereotypes associated with Somali refugees. 
Many governments, communities and individuals receiving or dealing with Somalis in their 
respective countries have developed a negative, stereotypical perception of them. In countries 
both within and outside Africa Somalis are perceived has having a proclivity for violence in 
both personal and communal relations, and seen as presenting special and intractable 
difficulties when it comes to full integration into their new communities. The report concludes 
that overcoming a stereotypical attitude and approach towards Somali refugees will be a 
crucial part of any effort to find durable solutions to their problems. (UNHCR 2005b: 41) 
 
The solution of helping refugees in the host country or promoting repatriation seems to be the 
preferred solution of donor countries. An example of this is the Danish Regions of Origin 
Initiative (Nærområdeinitiativet) which aims to support the registration of refugees in the 
camps, development in the host country and repatriation initiatives. (UM 2005)  
Local integration 
In Kenya, legal integration of refugees has been avoided by the government for various 
reasons. (Lindley 2011: 44) Overall local integration as solution to the massive problem of 
encampment, have been met with high opposition from landless locals, plus the fact that 
economic and political odds are against such solution. Thus, in 2006 the Refugees Act was 
approved followed by creation of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) in 2009, showing a 
greater government involvement on the issues relating to refugees. (Ibid: 21) In the following 
we will discuss the barriers and possibilities regarding local integration of refugees into the 
Kenyan society. 
Somali refugees as a security concern 
Security has always been a central concern of Kenyan refugee policy since the colonial period, 
and the perception that state security is jeopardized by the presence of refugees is prevalent. 
(Crisp 2000: 615) Kenya’s strict policies towards refugees can be explained by a chronic 
shortage of arable land and a particular ‘fear’ of ethnic Somalis based on a perception of them 
as people who can threat national security. Crisp states that it is due to the issue of security, 
that the Kenyan government have sought to limit the number of refugees and rejected that 
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exiled populations could be given land and allowed to settle in the country on a long term 
basis. (Ibid: 616) 
While Kenyans generally express sympathy and duty towards refugees, and even some 
admire the strong Somali family network, then success of Somali businesses in Kenya have led 
to suspicion of links between those businesses, piracy and criminality (Lindley 2011: 41 - 43),  
which have led to a reluctance towards granting Somalis with asylum. Though, it is not a one 
way prejudice. Because, while some Kenyans might look negatively upon Somali people, also 
some Somalis do not see themselves as part of Kenyan society, which is a dangerous situation 
that can fuel the notion of security. (Ibid) 
Recent concerns about Al-shabaab growing into a ‘pan-East African entity, the wider concern 
of religious extremism in Kenya, the growing food concern, together with older tendencies to 
criminalise refugees and the long-term securitisation of the Northern East District, have led 
the government to view Somali refugees as a security threat to the state, which becomes a big 
obstacle to local integration. (Ibid: 22 - 23) 
Self-settlement and development 
Al though refugees in the former section have been portrayed as a group who placed a strain 
on society, it should be noted that many refugees also manage to self-settle, integrate socially 
and become economic self-reliant. Many refugees move towards the urban centres in pursue 
of a better life than that to be found in camps. 
The Eastleigh district of Nairobi is a major centre for Somalis in Kenya, as well as the wider 
region. It is a place of deprivation, crime and failing infrastructure but also vibrant and 
informal trade centre, where young Somalis fall into the urban picture as all other groups in 
the city. (Ibid: 38). From the government’s side there is a growing acceptance of these 
people’s presence in the cities but still it is not an easy task for UNHCR to promote programs 
of education and heath to secure the Somalis with their basic needs. While many of them are 
self-reliant and manage to blend in, there are still huge poverty issues.  Since UNHCR is not 
mandated to do long term development activities, and also have issues in relation to trust the 
local authorities, such program are not easy to run. 
There have been some tensions between the DRA and UNHCR. DRA is dissatisfied with the 
level of support from donors, while UNHCR due to concerns of instability and corruption are 
reluctant to be a party in an externally funded public bureaucracy. (Ibid: 21) Furthermore 
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there have been tensions between UNHCR and DRA in the handover of responsibilities, where 
UNHCR is concerned about whether DRA are capable of maintaining reliable government 
systems. (Ibid: 22) A part from UNHCR suspicions towards DRA, many scholars and NGO have 
been criticizing UNHCR for their use of ‘soft power’ and lack of political mandate in this field 
of large threats to human rights. (Ibid: 22) 
Since 2002 UNHCR has taken a more proactive approach towards the urban refugees and the 
work in the field is constantly progressing. (Ibid: 38 – 39) While those programmes towards 
urban refugees might be progressing, urban centres such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Eldoret, and 
Kisumu host a growing population of refugees and asylum-seekers. According to UNHCR there 
were in 2012, 55.000 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Nairobi. (Horn 2013: 19) 
Thus the issue of refugee status and development is also highly an issue of capacity. Whether 
UNHCR has a chance to help those already settled in the cities is one question, but it makes the 
chance of integrating even more refugees to the cities highly difficult. Furthermore it should 
be noted that UNHCR’s 12-month budget is not designed to implement development 
programs and therefore other development partners need to be involved. However, the 
refugee-hosting area is not defined in any government-led development planning processes 
and falls under the jurisdiction of several districts with their own independent planning 
processes. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 67) 
The government of Kenya describe Dadaab as a security threat, and have repeatedly 
threatened to close the camps and forcibly return all residents to southern Somalia if not 
being compensated more by donors for the burden of refugees. In December 2012 it has also 
been announced that all refugees in urban areas should be driven out of the cities and 
relocated to refugee camps. (Amnesty International 2013:148) Local politicians in the area of 
the camps are also typically quite vocal in stressing the environmental problems associated 
with the presence of the camps, and the need for financial aid directed towards the host 
community. These expressions of problems by hosting refugees and the associated need for 
funding show how both national and local politicians use the refugee problems as justification 
for more international aid. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 68) According to Enghoff studies have shown 
that the total economic benefits for the host community around Dadaab were around USD 14 
million annually in 2010 (Ibid: 2010: 75) The benefits have been increasing with the rising 
budget allocations for refugee operations and host community initiatives, which can serve as a 
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economic argument for both host communities and national government to concentrate more 
people in Dadaab and thereby attracting more foreign aid.  
(Lindley 2011: 22) 
Despite the fact that some refugees move into urban areas in search for employment 
opportunities, there is some pull factors unique to the Dadaab area. First of all there is the 
availability of cheap food due to indirect subsidy via distribution in the camps and imports via 
Somalia.  There is an opportunity to register as a refugee and receive a ration card and there is 
more services in the area than in other comparable places, and there is the existence of more 
employment opportunities than in the poor surrounding area of Dadaab. These are benefits 
which keep people from moving into the host area (Enghoff et. Al. 2010: 69), and since the 
government themselves are threatening to send urban refugees to Dadaab camp, we will now 
try to look into the possibilities of development activities in Dadaab as a durable solution.  
 
Development of Dadaab Camp 
In a protracted refugee situation as the one in Dadaab, it is not known when the refugees will 
return and the humanitarian operation phased out. Therefore it is difficult to decide when to 
address problems and when to utilise opportunities. In Dadaab, this has in practice meant a 
compensatory approach to immediate and visible problems and very little consideration by 
government and development agencies of the development opportunities that the presence of 
so many refugees and a camp of the size of Dadaab constitude. (Ibid: 72) 
With the significant impacts on the Dadaab host area arising from the presence of the refugee 
camps, there is a need to further integrate the support provided to refugees with the aid 
provided to host communities. (Ibid: 72) A short-term humanitarian approach to support is 
not conducive to meaningful development of neither the host area nor the camp (Danida 
2008: 6), because despite the positive impacts that the aid to Dadaab has had on the host area, 
there is still a large food crises both within and outside the camp. The multiplicity of 
humanitarian donors providing disparate support complicates development efforts, and 
without stronger leadership from the government of Kenya in terms of planning and 
coordination, the nature of this support is likely to remain unchanged. It is possible to identify 
options for a more harmonised approach to refugees and host community support, 
particularly in relation to trade and business development, which could include: supporting 
and legalising trade and business development; and providing a larger percentage of support 
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to refugees (food rations) and host communities as cash transfers (food relief), thereby 
further facilitating trade and development of local markets in the area. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 
79)  
 
The “Refugees Act, 2006” requires the government of Kenya to take complete responsibility 
over refugee management and governance (SPCP 2007: 2), but since it is at its initial state, all 
activities regarding refugees are being carried out by UNHCR. (UNHCR 2005c: 16) It is a view 
among various Kenyan stakeholders that there is a need for a clear transitional strategy for 
the government to take over responsibility for refugee management, including a governance 
structure that will enable the government to introduce proper and effective accountability 
mechanisms for refugee protection. (Ibid: 16) While it seems as a logical solution that 
refugees should be assisted by local authorities, it also seems as way of burden relief to 
UNHCR. Putting the bare responsibility of the refugees on the Kenyan government, who 
already face a tremendous task with the challenge of 8 million IDP’s in the Region of the Great 
Lakes (Refugee consordium of Kenya 2013: 5 – 7) does not seem as a sustainable way of 
burden sharing but more as a practice of bio-power, and a way to avoid asylum seekers in the 
west. The government of Kenya has already been responsible for district development plans 
in the area of Dadaab camp. The plans range of activities for each district, but do only focus on 
the environmental impact of the area and not any measures to develop positive opportunities 
for the refugees. It is understandable that the government wishes to prevent the 
environmental degradation that Dadaab poses to the area, but on the other hand it 
problematizes  work towards a connection between refugee assistance and development aid, 
when the government themselves doesn’t seem to emphasize responsibility towards 
improvement of camp life.   
The implementation of development programmes for refugees is then still left with 
humanitarian agencies. (Enghoff et. Al. 2010: 71) The Kenya Red Cross/Danish Red Cross 
Initiative in Health is an integrated health project targeting both refugees and host 
communities around Dadaab since 2005, and more than half of the host population in Dadaab 
relies on the project’s monthly medical outreach (Ibid: 71). Despite the fact that international 
agencies and western governments’ wishes to place more of the responsibility of refugees on 
the shoulders of the government, (UNHCR 2005c: 16) the government does not seem to have 
focus on the actual camp life, when working with development in the district.  
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If development planning were designed to consider the Dadaab area as a centre for economic 
activities and a place of development that attracts many immigrants, it would be easier to plan 
development more appropriately. As it is now, development planning does not recognise that 
the Dadaab camps function as a major urban centre, meaning that such planning is not in line 
with reality. (Enghoff et. Al 2010: 79) Referring to Susan Banki’s concept of “local integration 
in the intermediate term” and reflecting on Kenyan refugee camps, Misselwitz argues that the 
ability of refugees to freely participate in the economic and communal life of the host region 
does not necessarily mean abolishing their status as refugees. Full participation in the civil life 
of a host country should not compromise the political right to return or to receive 
compensation. (Misselwitz 2010: 385) Also stakeholders working with UNHCR in Kenya have 
recommended that refugees should be permitted greater freedom of movement so as to 
facilitate economic exchanges between refugees and local communities. Access to business 
and trading licences and free movement will enable refugees to contribute more fully to the 
overall economic development of hosting areas. (UNHCR 2005c: 16) 
 
Though an integration of refugee assistance and development in theory might both contribute 
to the standard of living of those in the camp and those outside, it is our opinion that 
strategies should not overshadow the very fact that refugees should be granted with citizen 
rights. Conversely, we must take into consideration the African context and case that we are 
analyzing, where official ‘citizen rights’ are less important for the daily life. Rights are in an 
African context at many times informal, cultural or historic determined and thereby one could 
question what difference it makes to a refugee, whether he or she has been granted with 
citizenship. Officially citizenship grants people the right to work, but as explained earlier, 
refugees will work and will move whether permitted or not. What should instead be 
acknowledged in camp strategies, is that when population size of the camps has grown to the 
size of a town, it is logical that sustainable camp governance should learn from municipal 
management, (Misselwitz 2010: 386) so that the democratic structures that western countries 
so broadly are trying to pursue in development strategies (OECD 2008: 15) also will be 
reflected in protracted refugee encampment with no durable solutions found. (Misselwitz 
2010: 386) As Aubone suggests: “Perhaps more viable solutions begin with recognizing the 
Dadaab refugee camp complex as a long-term community, and developments can be made 
accordingly” (Aubone 2013: 40). She refers here to the fact that there are now three 
generations living in the Dadaab camps, and the density of the inhabitants has reached above 
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400.000, indicating it is more of a long-term community rather than temporary dwelling. The 
camps have clinics, schools, churches, and markets and have the appearance of a city , It is 
therefore argued that when repatriation, resettlement and local integration seem unlikely, a 
durable solution might be found in an improvement of the camps settlements, though it is 
highly unlikely that such improvement will include granting refugees with citizenship, but 
that it is also not a requirement for a democratic structure to be reflected, or for having an 
administration that works for granting the refugees right to work and improved access to 
education.  
Conclusion 
We have shown in our analysis that protracted encampment of refuges and lack of durable 
solutions to refugee issues often is caused by the chronic state of political emergency in the 
countries from where the refugees flee, which makes an early repatriation of refugees 
unlikely, while governments in both the global north and south are hesitant in providing 
protection to refugees and offer asylum in their countries. The reasons for the encampment of 
refugees and the strict asylum policies are to be found in various social, economic and political 
concerns in relation to the settlement of refugees.  
Refugees are perceived to place an environmental and financial burden on the host country, 
and it is argued that host countries don’t have the capacity to absorb the large number of 
refugees. The settlement of refugees is feared to cause social instability and to pose a threat to 
national security. Further, it is believed that the influx of refugees can deteriorate the values 
underpinning democratic systems, and governments express concerns about the ability of 
assimilating people.  
These concerns confirm that most of the reasons why states are reluctant to grant asylum to 
refugees are associated with fearism and the separation of politics from humanitarian 
concerns. The perception that refugees can threaten the well-being of a state has been 
normalized, and this fear justifies that the protection of refugees is not of high priority and 
that their rights are being violated.  This notion has been confirmed in the study of Dadaab by 
the facts that (i) Somali refugees are being kept in unsecure camps for decades in order to be 
controlled politically, and (ii) western governments make further restrictions on the 
requirements for Somali people to obtain asylum, and promote Somali repatriation 
programmes even though Somalia is still highly unstable.  
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The encampment of refugees is also caused by an unwillingness of host countries to do an 
effort in integrating refugees, if the international society and donor states are not willing to 
share the burden and offer resettlement. There is an ongoing conflict between host states in 
the global south and donor states in the north where both parties attempt to avoid the 
responsibility for the protection of refugees. The possibilities of the UNHCR to provide 
durable solutions for refugees are affected by this extremely politicization of humanitarian 
aid, because the organization has to work according to its non-political mandate.  
Both the possibilities for the three durable solutions and the critique of the conditions in 
refugee camps have been questioned by the contextualization of the theory in the Dadaab 
case. The protracted encampment implies that the camps grow in size and density of 
population and normalization appears which gives the camps the characteristics of cities. 
Sometimes the conditions in the camps are even better than in the surrounding areas. 
It is suggested in the context of these large camps that the focus should be turned away from 
local integration, resettlement, and repatriation and instead aid agencies and governments 
should recognize the Dadaab refugee camp as a permanent community. The control which 
governments and UNHCR manage to exercise over the refugees is in any case limited, since 
many refugees manage to self-settle, integrate socially and become economic self-reliant. 
To enhance the benefits the economic activity in refugee camps can bring the host community, 
and in order to make both local integration and repatriation possible a close cooperation 
between development and humanitarian aid agencies have been suggested. We have shown in 
our analysis that even though this concerted planning of aid could serve as a more efficient 
use of development funds, and a way to further the burden-sharing, such cooperation proves 
very difficult, and also politicized.  
While development aid is provided conditionally and thereby politically, a humanitarian 
mandate does not allow a political agenda. The situation as in Somalia also demonstrates that 
both approaches face challenges by working in quasi-states before there have been 
established a security space and stable state institutions.   
Studying the political debates around the Dadaab camps also shows that the development 
approach agreed upon by both the Kenyan government and the donor countries risk to 
transform unconditional humanitarian aid into a political tool. The donor states can use this 
approach to make the Kenyan government take a greater responsibility for refugees, and 
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Kenya can use it in order to get more development aid. This political agenda and the 
recognition of camps as cities risk leading the focus away from finding durable solutions and 
granting rights to refugees, and instead reinforcing the institutionalization of the camps.  
  
57 
 
Bibliography 
 
Articles 
Abdi M., Awa (2005): “In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity amongst Somali Refugees 
in Dadaab Camps”, A International Journal of Somali Studies: Vol. 5, Article 7. 
Appadurai, Arjun (1996): ”Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization”, 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Barbero, Julie C.(1993): “Refugee Repatriation During Conflict: A new conventional Wisdom“, 
Refuge, Vol 12, No.8 , March 1993.            
Betts, Alexander; Loescher Gill; Milner James (2012): “UNHCR: The politics and practice of 
refugee protection”, Global Institutions, Routhledge. 
Black, Richard (1998): “Putting refugees in camps”, people in camps feature, Forced Migration 
Review. 
Campell, H. Elizabeth: ”Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of 
survival, and possibilities for integration”, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 19. No 3, 2006. 
Chimni, B.S (1998): “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, School of international Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. 
Chimni, B.S (1999): “From resettlement to involuntary repatriation: Towards a critical history 
of durable solutions to refugee problems”, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 
2, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. 
Crépeau et. al (2006): “Forced Migration and Global processes – A view from forced migration 
studies”. Lexington books. 
Crisp, Jeff (2001): “Mind the gab! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development 
process”, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 43, UNHCR Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis Unit. May 2001. 
58 
 
Crisp, Jeff (2000): “Africa’s refugees: patterns, problems and policy challenges”, New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 28, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit. August 
2000. 
Crisp, Jeff (2000): ”A state of insecurity: The political economy of violence in Kenya’s refugee 
camps”, African Affairs. 
Crisp, Jeff  & Fielden, Alexandra (2011):”Local integration: reviving a forgotten solution”, 
UNHCR, FMR 30. 
Downey, Athony (2009): “Zones of Indistinction, Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Bare Life’ and the politics 
of Aesthetics’”, Third text, Vol. 23, Issue 2, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. 
Forsynthe, David (2001): “UNHCR’s mandate: the politics of being non-political”, New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 33, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. March 2001. 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara (2002): “Can humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?”, Human 
Rights Quaterly 24, 51 - 85, The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara (2000): “Are refugee camps for children?”, New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Working Paper No.29, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, American University 
in Cairo. 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara (1989): “Under what conditions is it the most desirable solution for 
refugees? An agenda for research”, African Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 1. 
Held, David & McGrew, Anthony (2002): ”Globalization/Anti-Globalization”, Blackwell 
Publishing, UK.  
Hovil, Lucy (2007): “Self-settled Refugees in Uganda: An alternative Approach to Displacement”, 
Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 20. No 4, Refugee Law Project, Faculty of Law, Makerere 
Univeristy, Kampala, Uganda. 
Hyndman, Jennifer (2007): “Refugee Self-Management and the Question of Governance”, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, vol 16. No. 2. 
Jackson, Robert & Sørensen, Georg (2010): ”Introduction to International Relations”, 4th 
Ediction, Oxford University Press, New York. 
59 
 
Jacobsen, Karen (1997): ”Refugees' Environmental Impact:The Effect of Patterns of Settlement”, 
Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1. 
 
Jacobesen, Karen (2001):  ”The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing 
countries”, Working paper nr. 45, New Issues in Refugee Research. 
Jaji, Rose (2010): ”Social Technology and Refugee Encampment in Kenya”, Journal of Refugee 
Studies Vol. 25, No. 2,. Oxford University Press. 
 
Keely, Charles B. (1996): How Nation-States Create and respond to refugee Flows. 
International Migration review, vol 30, No.4. pp.1046-1066. 
Kibreab, Gaim (1993): “The myth of dependency among camp refugees in Somalia 1979 – 1989”, 
Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 6. No 4, 1993. 
Lindley, Anna (2011): ”Between a protracted and A Crisis situation: Policy responses to Somali 
refugees in Kenya”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 30, No.4, 2011. 
Loescher, Gill (1993): “Beyond Charity – International Cooperation and the Global Refugee 
Crisis”, Oxford University Press 
Loescher, Gill (2003): “Refugees as grounds for international action” in Newman, Edward; Van: 
“Refugees and forced displacement – International security, Human vulnerability, amd the 
state”, The United Nations University Press. 
Misselwitz, Philipp & Sari Harnafi (2010): ”Testing a new paradigm: UNRWAs Camp 
improvement programme”,  Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 28, Nos 2 & 3 
  
Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine (2000): Refugee Camps or Cities? “The socio-economic 
Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya” Journal of refugee studies, vol 
13, No. 2. 
 Selm, Joanne (2003): “Refugees and Forced Displacement – International security, Human     
Vulnerability and the state”. United Nations University Press 
60 
 
Mertus, Julie (1998): “The State and the Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: New Models, New    
Questions”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.10 No.3. Oxford University Press 1998. 
Stein N., Barry (1986): “Durable solutions for Developing Country”, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue: Refugees: Issues and Directions, Summer. 
Smith, Yda J. (2010): “Resettlement of Somali Bantu Refugees in an era of Economic 
Globalization”, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. No 3, Oxford University Press.  
Sørensen, Georg (2006): ”Svage stater: en introduktion”, Politica 2006. Tidsskrift.dk. 
Van Damme, Win (1995): “Do refugees belong in camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea”, 
Vol. 346, The Lancet. 
Verdirame, Guglielmo (1999): “Human Rights and Refugees: The Case of Kenya”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 1999, Oxford University Press. 
Werker, Eric (2007): “Refugee Camp Economies”, Jornal of refugee Studies Vol. 20, No.3. 
Oxford University Press 2007. 
 
Reports 
Amnesty International (2013): “The state of the worlds human rights”, Peter Benneson house, 
United Kingdom. 
Abdi Umar, Martin Enghoff, Bente Hansen, Bjørn Gildestad, Matthew Owen og Alex Obara 
(2010): “In search of protection and livelihoods: Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of 
Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities”, Royal Danish Embassy, Republic of Kenya and 
Norwegian Embassy.  
 
Danish Immigration Service - DIS (2013): ”Update on security and human rights issues in 
South-Central Somalia, including in Mogadishu”, Joint report from the Danish Immigration 
Service’s and the Norwegian Landinfo’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, 
Somalia 17 to 28 October 2012. Copenhagen, January 2013 
 
Danida (2008): “The danish region of origin innitiative”, Udenrigsministeriet, 2008. 
61 
 
 
EHCO Factsheet (2013): ”European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protectin” , ECHO 
Factsheet , September 2013, Somalia.  
Enghoff, Martin; Hansen, Bente; Umar, Abdi; Gildestad, Bjørn; Owen, Matthew; Obara, Alex 
(2010): “In search of protection and livelihoods”, Danish Embassy, Republic of Kenya and 
Norweigan Embassy.  
 
Geneva Convetion (1949): “Relative to the protection of civilian persons in the time of war of 12 
August 1949”, IV, Part I.  
 
Human Rights Center (2013): “Safe haven - Sheltering Displaced Persons from Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence”, Case Study Kenya, University of California.  
 
OECD (2008): “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action 
2005/2008”, OECD, Paris.  
 
Refugee consortium of Kenya (2013): ”Behind the scenes” 
 
SPCP framework 2007  
 
UM (2005): “Nærområdeinitiativet”, Udenrigsministeriet 2005.  
UNHCR (2005a): “Handbook for planning and implementing Development Assistance for 
Refugees (DAR) Programmes”, UNHCR, Geneve. 
 
UNHCR (2005b): “Strengthening Refugee Protection, Assistance and Support to Host 
Communities in Kenya And Comprehensive Plan of Action for Somali Refugees”, Report on Kenya 
Stakeholder Consultation, UNHCR Strengthening protection capacity project. Co-Funded by 
the European Commission and the Governments of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the UK 
 
UNHCR (2005c): “strengthening capacity project”, Report on Kenya Stakeholder Consultation 
 
62 
 
UNHCR (2006): “Handbook for protection of internally displaced persons”, global protection 
cluster working group.  
 
UNHCR (2007): “Handbook for Emergencies”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Geneva Third Edition February, 2007 
 
UNHCR (2011a): ”UNHCR resettlement handbook”, UNHCR Geneva. 
 
UNHCR (2011b): ”UNHCR repatriation handbook”, UNHCR Geneva. 
 
UNHCR (2013): “Displacement the 21th century challenge. Global trends 2012”, UNHCR, 
Geneva. 
 
UNHCR (2013a): ”Somalia fact sheet” , Oct. 2013, UNHCR Web Portal/Horn of Africa Crisis  
Smith, Anna: ” FMO Thematic Guide - Camps versus settlements” 
NRC (2008): “Camp management Toolkit”, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)/The Camp 
Management Project (CMP), May, 2008 
 
Webpages 
 
Web 1: UNHCR -  http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c101.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 2: UNHCR- http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 3: UNHCR- http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 4: UNHCR- http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c101.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 5: UNHCR- http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 6: UNHCR- http://www.unhcr.org/pges/49c3646cbc.html,  last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 7: UNHCR - http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 8: UNHCR - http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cfe.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
63 
 
Web 9: UNHCR - http://www.unhcr.org/5294819e9.htm, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 10: UNHCR - http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 11: UNHCR - http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.4950731/, last seen 18. 
Dec 2013 
Web 12: UNHCR -http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 13: Fund for Peace’s failed state index (FFP) -  http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-
sortable , (2013) last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 14: European Union External Action - EU Relations with Somalia (EEAS) - 
http://eeas.europa.eu/somalia/ (2013), last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 15: EU - 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/documents/press_corner/ec_brochure_finale_en.
pdf, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 16: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) - http://www.msf-seasia.org/news/14961 (2013), 
last seen 18. Dec 2013 
Web 17: Amnesty International -  http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-somalia-
refugees-2013-10-01 (2013), last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 18: Amnesty International -  http://www.globalissues.org/article/263/amnesty-
international-human-rights-backlash (2001), last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 19: CNN - http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/02/world/africa/kenya-mall-attack-
shabaab-warning/ (2013), last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 20: EU - 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_person
s_asylum_immigration/l33153_da.htm, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
Web 21: Information - http://www.information.dk/461960, last seen 18. Dec 2013 
64 
 
Web 22: EU – http://www.resettlement.eu/page/linking-eu-resettlement-project, last seen 
18. Dec 2013 
Web 23: EU - http://www.resettlement.eu/page/resettlement-saves-lives-2020-campaign, 
last seen 18. Dec 2013 
 
 
